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 Conformity Assessment Body (Checks whether traded products 
comply with existing requirements.)
 : The Codex Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection 
and Certification Systems 
 : Any procedure used, directly or 
indirectly, to determine that requirements are fulfilled. Conformity assess-
ment procedures include procedures for sampling, testing and inspection; 
evaluation, verification and assurance of conformity; registration, accreditta-
tion and approval; as well as their combinations. 
 : A system that has its own rules of proce-
dure and management for carrying out conformity assessment. 
 : A conformity assessment 
body accepted (e.g. by a Party to an MRA) as being competent to 
test/certify/mark in accordance with agreed/prevailing legislative require-
ments.
 Santé et protection des Consommateurs (The European 
Commissions Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs) 
 European Community (The EC changed name to the EU when the 
Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union entered into force on 1 
November 1993. However EC continues to exist as Pillar One of the EU, 
which encompasses economic, trade, and social policies ranging from 
agriculture to education.) 
 European Economic Community (the former name of the EC) 
 A process involving judgements of whether 
two measures (such as food safety measures), although they are different, can 
achieve equivalent levels of protection or of other stated objectives. 
 : European Union (For reasons of simplicity we use the name European 
Union (EU) throughout the report even when EC or EEC is the formally 
correct name.)
 United States Food and Drug Administration
 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Signed in 1947 and 
was the predecessor to WTO.)
 A practise related to the 
proactive steps that are taken to ensure that products are safe, pure, and 
 vi 
effective. This requires a quality approach to manufacturing, enabling 
companies to minimize or eliminate instances of contamination, mix-ups, 
and errors.  This in turn, protects the consumer from purchasing a product 
which is ineffective or even dangerous.
 International Plant Protection Convention
 Mutual Recognition Agreements
 Non-tariff Trade Barriers
 Office International des Epizooties (World Organization for Animal 
Health)
 : Protocol on European Conformity Assessment
 (the WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures
 (the WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
 the Transatlantic Economic Partnership
 United States
 the United States Department of Agriculture
 the United States Trade Representative
 Veterinary Equivalency Agreements
 World Trade Organization (Established in 1995 as a successor to 
GATT.)
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This report explores how equivalence and mutual recognition have been applied by 
the European Union (EU) in order to facilitate trade. The EU is of particular 
interest in this area because it has been in the forefront internationally with regard 
to applying these tools, both in its internal market project and in its external trade 
relations. 
The report includes an empirical mapping of EUs experience with applying 
equivalence and mutual recognition as trade facilitating tools. The aim here is to 
increase the understanding of how these tools can be relevant and important in a 
wider global context, in particular with regard to food trade. Furthermore, based on 
this experience some of the challenges that countries are faced with when applying 
these tools are highlighted thus allowing some assessments of the prospects of and 
difficulties in achieving trade facilitation through these means. 
Chapter 2 includes an account of some of the regulatory approaches that the EU 
has pursued in its attempts at realising an internal market, from the adoption of 
common rules, to mutual recognition and the Better Regulation programme 
included in the Lisbon strategy. Chapter 3 discusses EUs rules for third-country 
relations. Furthermore, some of EUs mutual recognition and equivalence agree-
ments are explored. In addition to these, Chapter 3 includes an account of one-way 
judgements of equivalence included in EUs rules for imports of organic food and 
fishery products. Chapter 4 presents EUs work and positions on equivalence and 
mutual recognition in the WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Chapter 
5 includes an assessment of the EUs experience with mutual recognition and 
equivalence. Finally, in Chapter 6 some conclusions and final remarks are made. 
EUs institutional framework possesses some characteristics, which indicate that 
it is easier for the EU to facilitate trade between its Member States than it is to 
facilitate trade between countries in many other international settings. EUs 
comprehensive legal framework and its relatively strong institutions to enforce 
common rules, give it a strong regulatory capacity and thus make it a special case 
with regard to how trade can be facilitated between nation states. 
Thus, one has to have lower expectations with regard to facilitating trade in 
many other international settings. The experience of the EU certainly show that 
equivalence and mutual recognition may be useful trade facilitating tools and that 
these tools could be used and could have a positive effect in trade relations 
between certain countries. However, there are many problems attached to this. For 
example, developing countries will in many cases have problems achieving equiva-
lence and/or recognition of their conformity assessment systems because of inade-
quacies in infrastructure and regulatory capacity.  
Furthermore, even when these tools are applied between countries with similar 
levels of development and regulatory capacities, many problems can arise. These 
tools may therefore in many cases be costly to apply in practise. Thus, one has to 
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carefully consider whether it is worth the effort to enter into processes of judging 
equivalence and seeking mutual recognition.  
Therefore, it seems important to consider on a case-by-case basis whether these 
tools should be applied. Furthermore, increased activity of international standardi-
zation bodies, active country participation in these bodies, and widespread 
adherence to international standards, will enhance the application of equivalence 
and mutual recognition, as well as enhance harmonization.  
Finally, in many cases equivalence and mutual recognition (and harmonization) 
will initially not be the most (cost) effective trade facilitating tools. Often, softer 
approaches such as regulatory dialogue, information sharing etc., may be easier to 
initiate and maintain. It may take a long time to reach the goal of removing trade 
barriers by using these approaches, but they may still be more effective in the long 
run, not least because they may more effectively lead to harmonization. The EU 
has for some years used soft approaches with the aim of facilitating trade, but only 
as a supplement to other approaches such as MRAs.  
One example of an alternative approach is the regulatory dialogue that has been 
established between the EU and the U.S. The two parties have agreed on 
Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency under the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership (TEP) and in 2004 they furthermore set out a roadmap for 
this co-operation. The roadmap outlines a range of specific regulatory cooperation 
activities the parties jointly intend to pursue. It includes: specific sectoral co-
operation, such as co-operation on food safety, pharmaceuticals and auto safety 
regulation;  horizontal initiatives, such as a regular informal dialogue on regulatory 
policy issues and practices of mutual interest; identification of resources and 
mechanisms to promote exchanges of U.S. and EU regulatory experts in specific 
areas/projects, and seminar/workshops where regulators can exchange views and 
raise awareness of regulatory activities, priorities and approaches on issues of 
mutual interest. The European Commission has established such regulatory dialo-
gues with several other countries and has in fact stated that it will increase its 
attention and efforts towards the use of such approaches to regulatory 
compatibility. 
This report thus points out some of the difficulties involved in applying 
equivalence and mutual recognition as trade facilitating tools in bilateral trade 
relations. Furthermore, it highlights the possible benefits of making greater efforts 
on so-called soft approaches to harmonization. As indicated above, by entering into 
regulatory dialogues and by sharing experiences more actively, regulatory 
authorities could contribute to building sufficient confidence and trust thus 
enhancing closer and more formalized co-operation such as, for example, MRAs 
and equivalence agreements. These softer regulatory co-operation efforts, which 
take place without the need to negotiate formal agreements, may subsequently lead 
to a gradual harmonization of regulatory systems thus enhancing the work on 
removing regulatory trade barriers. 
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Over the years, there has been an increased focus, both in academic literature and 
in discussions in international trade fora, on trade barriers caused by trade 
restrictive national regulations and product standards (Vogel 1995; Sykes 1995, 
1999; Egan 2001). An important question has been: How can trade be facilitated 
without compromising legitimate regulatory objectives such as health and environ-
mental protection? This report highlights two trade-facilitating tools: equivalence1 
and mutual recognitionand focuses on one of the most powerful economies 
where these tools are applied, namely the European Union (EU).2 
The reports purpose is thus twofold. First, I empirically map EUs experience 
with applying equivalence and mutual recognition as trade facilitating tools. My aim 
is to increase the understanding of how these tools can be relevant and important 
in a wider global context, in particular with regard to food trade.  Second, based on 
EUs experience I explore the challenges that countries are faced with when 
applying these tools. My goal here is to make some assessments on the prospects 
and difficulties in achieving trade facilitation through these means. 
This report is based on documents, reports, academic literature and a number of 
interviews with officials from the European Commissions DG SANCO3, DG 
Trade, DG Agriculture and DG Enterprise; officials from the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); officials 
                                           
 1 The terms equivalence and equivalency are used interchangeably throughout the report. 
 2 For reasons of simplicity I use the acronym EU (and not EEC: European Economic 
Community or EC: European Community) throughout the report. 
 3 DG SANCO is the acronym for the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs. 
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from delegations to the Codex Alimentarius Commission, and former officials of 
the Secretariat of Codex. 
 
Mutual recognition and equivalence can be used as tools to remove technical trade 
barriers caused by differences between regulatory systems.4 These tools can thus 
function as both alternatives and supplements to harmonization. Harmonization 
means that two or more rules are replaced by one common rule, whereas 
determination of equivalence means that the involved parties accept that rules 
are different as long as it is possible to determine that the rules fulfil some 
commonly stated objective in a satisfactory way. Thus, the concept of equivalence 
refers to the likeness (not sameness) of different rules with regard to some pre-
determined parameter. Outside the EU, the principle of mutual recognition is most 
often applied through so-called Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). These 
agreements allow two or more trading partners to accept that a commodity can be 
traded freely between/among them even though differences in their regulatory 
systems continue to exist. Normally, MRAs are designed to let trading partners 
accept each others conformity assessment systems in order to avoid that traded 
products will be subject to unnecessary and overlapping testing (by conformity 
assessment bodies in both the exporting and importing country). In the EU, the 
application of the mutual recognition principle guarantees free movement of 
certain goods and services without the need to harmonise Member States' national 
legislation. Thus, goods which are lawfully produced in one Member State cannot 
be banned from sale in the territory of another Member State, even if they are 
produced to technical or quality specifications which are different from those 
applied to the importing states own products.  
 
The theme of this report is what I have chosen to call the EU model of applying 
equivalence and mutual recognition as trade facilitating tools. The EU is a well-
advanced regional economic co-operation entity, and the member countries have 
throughout EUs history faced challenges in achieving two goals: removing trade 
barriers between themselves and promoting common trade policies towards third 
countries. 
One important means of achieving these goals has been to elaborate one 
common set of rules, i.e. to harmonize national rules. Another important means 
has been to remove regulatory trade barriers through the principle of mutual 
recognition, which was introduced in the EU in the 1970s. In the EU context, 
                                           
 4 See Veggeland and Elvestad (2004) for a more comprehensive explanation of mutual 
recognition and equivalence.  
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this principle ultimately implies that any national regulation with reasonable policy 
goals, such as environmental conservation, health, safety and so on, will be 
tolerated within the Single European Market. The principle of mutual 
recognition has together with the principle of equivalence also been applied in the 
EUs work on reducing regulatory trade barriers in its third-country relations.  
Thus, the EU stands out as both an important testing ground for achieving free 
trade internally between different countries, inter alia, through mutual recognition, 
and as one of the pioneers of trying out mutual recognition and equivalence as a 
supplement to harmonization and/or unilateral conformity in its third-country 
trade relations.  
 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 includes an account 
of different regulatory approaches that the EU has followed in its attempts at 
realising the internal market, from the adoption of common rules to mutual 
recognition and the Lisbon strategy. Chapter 3 discusses EUs trade with third 
countries. I provide an overview of EUs rules for third-country trade relations and 
of EUs mutual recognition agreements. Furthermore, I present examples of how 
the EU has applied equivalence and mutual recognition in its third-country 
relations within specific policy sectors. In Chapter 4 I present the EUs work and 
positions on equivalence and mutual recognition in the WTO and the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission. In Chapter 5 I make an assessment of the EUs experi-
ence with mutual recognition and equivalence. Finally, I present some conclusions 
and final remarks in Chapter 6. 
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In the period between the Treaty of Rome, which entered into force in 1958, and 
the Single European Market initiative, which was launched in 1985, the European 
Commission sought to address numerous obstacles to trade through an ambitious 
programme of regulatory harmonization (Egan 2001: 61). The Member States roles 
in setting their own regulatory standards were thus challenged in a number of 
different areas covered by the EU aquis.5 Due to complex and contradictory 
pressures of domestic interests, and subsequently a widespread opposition to many 
EU regulations among the Member States, the harmonization programme that was 
followed in the 1960s and 1970s ran into big difficulties in establishing common 
regulations and removing trade barriers. Thus, in most sectors, attempted harmoni-
zation efforts were commonly perceived to have largely failed. 
Attempts at harmonizing food regulations were also perceived to have failed 
(ORourke 1998). The Treaty of Rome did not explicitly mention food regulations. 
Furthermore, it did not originally mention the goals of consumer protection and 
public health, which traditionally are the core goals of national food regulations. 
Thus, based on the Treaty of Rome, food regulations were for many years mainly 
about removing trade barriers and establishing a functioning common market. This 
is reflected in the original Article 3 of the Treaty, which says that the EUs activities 
should include: 
                                           
 5 EU aquis: EU laws, practices, principles and obligations. 
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 the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of 
quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other 
measures having equivalent effect; 
 the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commer-
cial policy towards third countries; 
 the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for 
the proper functioning of the common market; 
 
Thus, based on the Treaty, until the amendment to Article 3 via the Single 
European Act in 1985 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, food regulations were 
part of the wider EU harmonization programme aimed at removing trade barriers 
and creating a well-functioning market. However, provisions on public health and 
consumer protection were implemented in the EU by first the Single European Act 
and then the Maastricht Treaty (cf. in particular Article 95 and Articles 152153 of 
the Treaty of Rome), thus laying down the basis for more coherent food policies 
and regulations at the EU level.  
The first EU food directive was concerned with colours in foodstuffs and was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1962. However, in the following years the 
adoption of food regulations was a slow, fragmented and piecemeal process, as was 
the case in many other sectors. Furthermore, the EU did not succeed in creating a 
genuine European Food Law that put consumer and health interests to the fore. 
Instead, food regulations were to a large degree based on commercial interests on 
the one side and on protecting Member States domestic interests on the other. 
Thus, EUs harmonization efforts in the food sector, as well as in most other 
sectors, ran into difficulties. However, a new momentum was created at the end of 
the 1970s when a new method of facilitating trade gained importance, namely the 
principle of mutual recognition. Moreover, the Single European Act and the plans 
for the realisation of the internal market that followed in the 1980s were to a large 
degree precisely about removing technical barriers to trade. Such trade barriers had 
continued, despite the ongoing harmonization efforts, not only in the food sector, 
but also in most other product sectors. 
 
As already indicated, harmonization of regulatory measures was for many years the 
EUs main instrument for removing trade barriers. However, based on the slow 
and limited progress of harmonization, the European Commission introduced 
alternative methods of trade facilitation at the end of the 1960s.  
In the General Programme for the removal of technical obstacles to trade, 
which was adopted by the Council in 1969, the EU proposed different ways to deal 
with trade barriers, including the new principle of mutual recognition (Egan 2001: 
69). Table 2.1 lists the different methods for eliminating trade barriers that were 
proposed and the conditions assumed to be necessary to carry them out. 
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Thus, the methods of both mutual recognition and reference to standards were 
introduced as alternatives and supplements to harmonization. The category 
Reference to standards indicates that instead of developing detailed regulations, 
regulators could focus on directives which cover only some core horizontal issues. 
The technical details could thus be covered by references to harmonized standards, 
which are developed by international standardization bodies. This is a method 
which became increasingly important following the later introduction of the New 
approach to technical harmonization (see below). 
In addition, with the intention of removing regulatory trade barriers more 
effectively, the European Commission was given the right to engage in administra-
tive rule-making, including the right to modify and update regulations. The 
Commission was nevertheless subject to oversight by committees composed of 
representatives from the Member States.  
The new methods for eliminating barriers to trade also provided greater 
regulatory flexibility in the process. The General Programme did not however, 
advance the process of removing trade barriers much further. First, only a fraction 
of the technical barriers was included in the programme. Second, the EU ran into 
the same problem, i.e. slow progress in adopting new rules, which characterized the 
old harmonization programme, even though new and more flexible methods had 
been introduced. Third, faced with this slow progress, the EU compromised in 
allowing Member States to push their particular domestic interests to the front and 
to place a range of products and production processes on import prohibition lists. 
These prohibitions were moreover often based on political rather than scientific or 
technical considerations. 
Hence, part of the process became counter-productive by allowing a system 
where certain Member States prohibited products and production processes at the 
national level, even though these were acceptable in other Member States. More-
over, the regulatory strategy of harmonization was still the dominant method 
pursued, and as Michelle Egan (2001: 82) has noted, this method ...proved 
                                           
 6 Table 2.1 is taken from Egan 2001:70.  
 7 NTB = Non-tariff Trade Barriers. 
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ineffectual because it was viewed as increasingly inappropriate at addressing the 
widespread effects of non-tariff barriers. 
Thus, the EUs failed efforts to remove technical barriers to trade in the 1970s 
can be characterized by the term eurosclerosis, a term which, inter alia, has been 
used to describe a European integration process that seemed to loose steam. 
However, at the end of the 1970s things began to change. An important turning 
point regarding the work on removing non-tariff trade barriers, including technical 
barriers to food trade, was the Cassis de Dijon case. Even though the principle of 
mutual recognition had been introduced to the EU as early as the late 1960s, it was 
the rulings in the Cassis de Dijon case that really made the principle an important 
part of EUs regulatory approach. 
The Cassis de Dijon case was about a French liqueurCassiswhich was prohi-
bited for import into Germany on the basis of a German statutory provision fixing 
a minimum alcoholic content for similar liqueur products produced and marketed 
in Germany (Egan 2001: 95). The provision stated that to be marketed as wine-
spirits these products needed to have a minimum alcohol content of 32 per cent; 
however, Cassis had an alcohol content of only 1520 per cent.  
The case was brought to court and the European Court of Justice ruled that the 
German provision constituted a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantita-
tive restriction. The Court further argued that ...there is no valid reason why, 
provided that they have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the 
Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into any other 
member state (Egan 2001: 96). The burden of proof to show non-discrimination 
thus fell on the importing country, i.e. the German government in this case. The 
Court assumed in the Cassis case that national standards in Germany and France 
were sufficiently equivalent to be mutually recognized as acceptable. The key 
passage of the judgement is the following (c.f. European Court of Justice 1979): 
 
In the absence of common rules, obstacles to movement within the community resulting from 
disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing of a product must be accepted 
in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy 
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the 
protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the 
consumer. 
 
The ruling thus stated the importance of the principle of mutual recognition and 
simultaneously indicated that harmonization would only be necessary when 
national regulations were not sufficiently equivalent (Egan 2001: 96).  
In a series of cases following the Cassis judgement the European Court of Justice 
has considered the validity of member state laws restricting trade in foodstuffs. The 
rulings in these cases have followed the Cassis judgement by reviewing the purpose, 
reasonableness, and application of national regulations (Egan 2001: 99).  
The Cassis judgement has thus paved the way for a regulatory approach in the 
EU where emphasis is put on harmonizing only those requirements that can be 
referred to as essential (c.f. health and consumer protection, etc.). Trade barriers 
caused by other regulatory disparities should to the extent possible be solved by 
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applying the principle of mutual recognition unless derogation is available under 
EU law, which, in the case of food products, means on public health grounds. This 
regulatory approach gained considerable influence in connection with the Single 
European Market Programme that was launched in the mid 1980s. 
 
The idea of mutual recognition swiftly became part of European policy-makers 
new strategy to promote market access and greatly influenced the design of the 
Single European Market Programme (Egan 2001: 107). The European Commission 
used the Cassis judgement in promoting a doctrine based on the principles of 
mutual recognition and equivalence of regulations and standards. The Commission 
argued that member state governments could not take an exclusively national view-
point because many national regulations were broadly equivalent (ibid.). 
The basic idea of the new doctrine was that importing countries in principle 
should allow imports of all products from other Member States as long as the 
products had been lawfully produced and conformed to the rules of the exporting 
country. Importantly this strategy aimed to promote free trade in general and the 
Single Market Programme in particular and thus to create a new momentum in the 
European integration process. 
The Single European Market Programme involved the adoption of a series of 
new EU regulations. The programme was launched in 1985 by the Single European 
Act and gave the Commission a mandate to provide a comprehensive package of 
proposals to complete the internal market by 1993 (Egan 2001: 113). Non-tariff 
trade barriers (NTBs) were treated as one of the issues that had to be addressed in 
order to obtain a well-functioning internal market. NTBs included the specifica-
tions of products, the use of different health and safety standards, environmental 
regulations, and quality control (Egan 2001: 114). 
Furthermore, the Single European Market Programme signalled the active use of 
the principle of mutual recognition. This is clearly illustrated in the following 
passage taken from the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market 
under Part Two: The Removal of Technical Barriers (European Commission 1985): 
 
57. The elimination of border controls, important as it is, does not of itself create a genuine 
common market. Goods and people moving within the Community should not find obstacles 
inside the different Member States as opposed to meeting them at the border.  
 
58. This does not mean that there should be the same rules everywhere, but that goods as well 
as citizens and companies should be able to move freely within the Community. Subject to 
certain important constraints (see paragraph 65 below), the general principle should be approved that, 
if a product is lawfully manufactured and marketed in one Member State, there is no reason why it should not 
be sold freely throughout the Community. Indeed, the objectives of national legislation, such as the protection of 
human health and life and of the environment, are more often than not identical. It follows that the rules and 
controls developed to achieve these objectives, although they may take different forms, essentially come down to 
the same thing, and so should normally be accorded recognition in all Member States, not forgetting the possibi-
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lities of cooperation between national authorities. What is true for goods is also true for services and 
for people. If a Community citizen or a company meets the requirements for its activity in one 
Member State, there should be no valid reason why those citizens or companies should not 
exercise their economic activities also in other parts of the Community. (authors emphasis). 
 
This shows that mutual recognition (and implicit equivalence) was an important 
part of the work on removing technical trade barriers within the EU with the aim 
of realising the internal market.  
 
The New Approach to technical harmonisation and standardisation was laid down 
in connection with the Single European Market Programme and established the 
following principles (European Commission 2000a: 7): 
 
 Legislative harmonisation is limited to essential requirements that products 
placed on the Community market must meet, if they are to benefit from free 
movement within the Community.  
 The technical specifications of products meeting the essential requirements 
set out in the directives are laid down in harmonised standards.  
 Application of harmonised or other standards remains voluntary, and the 
manufacturer may always apply other technical specifications to meet the 
requirements. 
 Products manufactured in compliance with harmonised standards benefit 
from a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential require-
ments. 
 
The New Approach calls for only essential requirements to be harmonised and thus 
requires that it be possible to distinguish between such essential requirements and 
technical specifications. Implicit in this approach therefore is the concept of 
equivalence whereby the applied technical specifications are allowed to differ as 
long as the essential requirements are met. 
In addition to the principles of the New Approach, the Commission saw the 
need for laying down the conditions for reliable conformity assessment procedures 
across national borders (European Commission 2000a: 8). Important in this respect 
were the building of confidence through competence and transparency, and the 
setting up of a policy and framework for conformity assessment. Thus, in 1989 the 
EU adopted the Global Approach to certification and testing, which included the 
following principles for EUs policy on conformity assessment (ibid.): 
 
 A consistent approach is developed in Community legislation by devising 
modules for the various phases of conformity assessment procedures, and by 
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laying down criteria for the use of these procedures, for the designation of 
bodies operating these procedures, and for the use of the CE marking.  
 The use of European standards relating to quality assurance (EN ISO 9000 
series), and to the requirements to be fulfilled by conformity assessment 
bodies operating quality assurance (EN 45000 series) is generalised. 
 Setting up of accreditation systems and the use of inter-comparison 
techniques are promoted in Member States and at Community level. 
 Mutual recognition agreements concerning testing and certification in the 
non-regulatory sphere are promoted. 
 The differences of existing quality infra-structures (such as calibration and 
metrology systems, testing laboratories, certification and inspection bodies, 
and accreditation bodies) between Member States and between industrial 
sectors are minimised by programmes. 
 International trade between the Community and third countries is promoted 
by means of mutual recognition agreements, cooperation and technical 
assistance programmes.  
 
The Global Approach was completed by a Council decision in 1993, which 
included general guidelines and detailed procedures for conformity assessment used 
in New Approach directives. According to this decision conformity assessment is 
based on (ibid.): 
 
 manufacturers internal design and production control activities;  
 third-party type examination combined with manufacturers internal 
production control activities;  
 third-party type or design examination combined with third-party approval 
of product or production quality assurance systems, or third-party product 
verification; 
 third-party unit verification of design and production; or  
 third-party approval of full quality assurance systems. 
 
It is important to note that the New Approach has not been applied in sectors 
where EUs legislation was well advanced prior to 1985, including, inter alia, the 
foodstuffs and veterinary sectors. In these sectors the old approach of 
developing detailed, mandatory regulations has prevailed. Thus, the legislation in 
these sectors has not been based on the principles of the New Approach. 
Nevertheless, the development of EUs food law has some resemblances to the 
New Approach.  
First, over time, the EU has concentrated its food legislation work on developing 
horizontal rules. These horizontal rules are based on requirements and objectives 
that are relevant across different product groups, i.e. based on the essential require-
ments and objectives of consumer and health protection. Thus, the work on 
vertical rules, dealing with product specific requirements based on political and 
commercial considerations, has been downgraded.  
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Second, many of EUs food regulations refer to international food standards, 
which specify the details that enable EU members to fulfil their obligations under 
EU law. Codex Alimentarius Commission standards are particularly important. An 
example of this is paragraph 4 in Commission Directive 2004/45/EC of 16 April 
2004. This Directive is an amendment to Directive 96/77/EC, which lays down 
specific purity criteria on food additives other than colours and sweeteners: 
 
(4) It is necessary to take into account the specifications and analytical techniques for 
additives as set out in the Codex Alimentarius as drafted by the Joint FAO/WHO Expert 
Committee on Food Additives (JECFA). 
 
Third, mutual recognition is widely applied in non-harmonized areas of the food 
sector, as is the case for the New Approach. 
Thus, even though the New Approach first and foremost is relevant for the 
sectors that were only slightly harmonized prior to 1985, it may nevertheless be 
seen as a broader approach to regulatory work, and one that is also relevant for 
other sectors in the EU where the Old Approach (regulative harmonization) still 
dominates, such as the food and veterinary sectors.  
 
EUs Lisbon Strategy was launched in 2000 when the European Council agreed to 
the goal of making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven 
economy by 2010 (European Council 2000). The Lisbon Summit called for a new 
method of open coordination, which was an approach that would serve as an 
alternative to traditional forms of EU policy formulation by involving, inter alia, 
active use of target setting and benchmarking. 
In the renewed Lisbon StrategyPartnership for Growth and Jobswhich 
was launched in the spring of 2005, a broad programme called Better Regulation 
was the centrepiece of the European Commissions agenda (European Commission 
2005).8 The objective was to make sure that regulations be used only when 
necessary and that the burdens they impose be proportionate with the aims. The 
Commission highlighted three tools and processes that would be utilized to achieve 
this objective: 
 
 Withdraw or modify pending legislative proposals 
 Simplify existing legislation 
 Use impact assessment and public consultation to ensure better quality in 
the development of new policy proposals 
 
So far the Better Regulation programme has resulted in a large number of 
proposals for EU laws being withdrawn and an initiative being taken to perform a 
                                           
 8 See also homepage of DG Enterprise: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/regulation/better_regulation/ 
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broad consultation with Members States and stakeholders on regulatory quality. 
Furthermore, a process of simplifying existing legislation has been initiated, starting 
with the most regulated sectors, such as cars, industrial waste and construction, 
followed by sectors such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and foodstuffs. 
The Better Regulation programme involves close co-operation between the 
European Commission, the Member States and other relevant stakeholders and 
consists of a wide range of approaches to improve the regulatory quality and 
performance in Europe. One of the new elements that the Better Regulation 
programme emphasizes is a more flexible and open approach to regulatory co-
ordination. The exchange of best practises and peer reviews, the search for good 
indicators to assess regulatory quality (c.f. benchmarking), and the active use of 
consultations and constructive dialogue with all stakeholders in order to decide on 
the proportionality of regulations, are some of the softer means that the EU will 
encourage in order to create a better regulatory culture and climate in Europe.  
The renewed Lisbon strategy thus introduces a supplement to the Old and 
New approaches by, inter alia, seeking to change the regulatory environment 
through softer approaches.  
 
The EU model of realising an internal market is characterized by comprehensive 
efforts to harmonize national regulations and standards while limiting to the extent 
possible the harmonization efforts to essential requirements and horizontal rules 
(such as hygiene rules). These efforts are combined with an active use of the 
principle of mutual recognition which allows national regulations and standards to 
differ as long as they fulfil the same core objectives. Inside the internal market the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition is thus first and foremost 
relevant in areas which have not been harmonised. 
Furthermore, the EU has moved to become more flexible in its approach 
towards regulative co-operation and harmonization, c.f. the open method of co-
ordination, benchmarking and voluntary co-operation and communication 
programmes, which are all inherent parts of the Lisbon strategy. The EU has thus 
established a set of complementary regulatory approaches to create a better 
regulatory environment and a well-functioning internal market. However, it is 
important to note that even though new regulatory approaches have been intro-
duced, technical harmonisation through the development of mandatory regulations 
is still a core activity of the EU.  
 
Trade Facilitation through Equivalence and Mutual Recognition: The EU Model 
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute / Centre for Food Policy, 2006 
16 
 
Trade Facilitation through Equivalence and Mutual Recognition: The EU Model 
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute / Centre for Food Policy, 2006 
17
 
 
One important aspect of the European integration process is the development of 
common trade policies towards third countries (Meunier 2005). These policies also 
include different tools to reduce the problem of trade barriers caused by the 
Member States different technical regulations, standards and conformity assess-
ment procedures. Thus, the EU has included in its policies on third-country trade 
relations the application of equivalence assessments and mutual recognition as tools 
to reduce the problem of regulatory trade barriers. 
 
The main legal basis for EUs common commercial policy is Article 133 of the EC 
Treaty. Articles 2527 lay down the provisions for a customs union and Articles 
2831 of the Treaty set out the provisions on the prohibitions against quantitative 
restrictions. In line with these provisions, the EU has adopted common rules and 
procedures for exports from and imports into the internal market. Furthermore, 
the European Commission has been given the task of negotiating trade agreements 
on behalf of the EU (Meunier 2005). This task is, however, based on a mandate 
decided by the Council. 
EUs common trade rules also include procedures for administering and imple-
menting trade arrangements, and procedures for information and consultation 
which are to be followed before implementing protective and punitive trade 
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measures. Furthermore, the EU has a common external trade policy in the fields of 
standards and conformity assessment (European Commission 1996, 2000b, 2001a, 
2003). The EUs objectives for external trade policy in the regulatory field can be 
summarised simply in two categories (WTO 2002b:4):  
 
 The first category includes the promotion of EUs commercial and export 
interests, namely the reduction of technical barriers in external markets 
and the prevention of the emergence of new ones.  
 The second category includes the promotion of EUs policies and 
concepts as accepted by its constituents, namely the encouraging of 
trading partners to adopt standards and regulatory approaches based on, 
or compatible with international and European practises. 
 
As will be illustrated in the next chapter, the separation of these two categories of 
objectives has also had an impact on how the EU organizes its external representta-
tion in the area of regulatory policies. 
The European Commission issued in 2001 a Commission Staff Working Paper 
in which it presented a broad variety of measures that, based on its experience, it 
viewed as useful in accomplishing trade facilitation (European Commission 2001a). 
The Commission foresees that in a fully-developed common market any product 
lawfully placed on the market in one territory would be equally freely marketed in 
the other territories. Of course, the EU itself has come a long way in achieving this 
through its internal market. 
However, there is no global parallel to EUs strong institutional framework 
which can be used to support the development and maintenance of a fully-fledged 
global common market. Thus, a less ambitious agenda should be set. Accordingly, 
the Commission refers to a series of important conditions/issues for facilitating 
global trade. The Commission furthermore links these conditions/issues to relevant 
trade facilitating tools that can be used to address them. This linkage is presented in 
an indicative list which however, is not exhaustive and which furthermore contains 
elements that are not mutually exclusive (European Commission 2001a: 9) (see 
Table 3.1)9: 
                                           
 9 See also Veggeland and Elvestad (2004: 25) where the same table is presented and 
commented upon in connection with a description of the work of the WTO TBT Committee 
on the issue of mutual recognition. 
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The European Commission concludes that the selection of the right tool depends 
on several different factors, including the characteristics of the markets, the 
regulatory environment in the third country or region concerned, and the 
willingness of the involved industries, regulators and other parties to achieve the 
agreed objectives (European Commission 2001a: 22). 
Only two of the tools mentioned by the European Commission will be discussed 
further in this report, namely, mutual recognition agreements and recognition of 
equivalence. The reason for drawing attention to only these two tools is that they 
have been placed high on the agenda of several international fora in recent years, 
e.g. the WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
 
The EU has been in the forefront internationally with regard to negotiating so-
called Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). These agreements lay down the 
conditions under which the EU and the third country concerned would accept 
conformity assessment procedures as being in conformity with the legislation of the 
other party to the agreement. Conformity assessment procedures include test 
reports, certificates and marks of conformity issued by conformity assessment 
bodies (CABs) in the countries involved. MRAs are thus first and foremost 
...instruments that facilitate market access by reducing costs and time associated 
with obtaining product approvals (DG Trade 2006). 
In general, MRAs do not imply regulatory convergence nor do they imply that 
regulations imposed on products by the Parties are to be brought into alignment. 
However, there are some exceptions to this. One example is the EUs MRA with 
Switzerland which deals with mutual recognition of certification in areas where the 
EU and Switzerland have the same regulations. Another example is the EU-U.S. 
MRA on marine equipment, which has as a precondition that both Parties use 
internationally agreed conventions as the underlying regulations that are subject to 
mandatory certification.  
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To this date the EU has negotiated seven so-called traditional MRAs, which 
are those agreements that provide for the recognition between trading partners of 
test results and mandatory certificates for certain industrial products.10 These 
traditional agreements furthermore cover only products that are subject to 
mandatory certification. 
 
 Australia (OJEC L 229 of 17/08/98) 
 New Zealand (OJEC L 229 of 17/08/98) 
 Canada (OJEC L 280 of 16/10/98) 
 United States (OJEC L 31 of 4/02/99) 
 Israel (OJEC L 263 of 9/10/99) 
 Japan (OJEC L 284 of 29/10/2001) 
 Switzerland (OJEC L 114 of 30/04/2002) 
 
In addition to these agreements, the EU has negotiated yet another MRA with the 
U.S. on Mutual Recognition of Certificates of Conformity for Marine Equipment, 
which was adopted by the Council in 2004. It is important to note that the EU has 
chosen to establish MRAs only with governments of third countries which are on a 
comparable level of technical development as the EU and moreover have a comparable 
approach concerning conformity assessment (European Commission 2000: 63). In 
principle, these agreements are supposed to include all the conformity assessment 
requirements of the parties necessary to obtain full market access. Moreover, the 
agreements function in such a way that the traded products are evaluated in the 
country of production against the regulatory requirements of the importing country 
(ibid.). 
The MRAs comprise framework agreements, which lay down the essential 
principles, and sectoral annexes, which specify the details, such as scope and 
coverage, regulatory requirements, lists of designated conformity assessment bodies 
etc. As already noted, EUs MRAs are confined to conformity assessment proce-
dures and are thus not based on the necessity that the parties accept each others 
technical regulations and standards, or that they consider as equivalent each others 
legislation in the fields concerned.  
Nevertheless, MRAs presuppose the existence of a comparable level regarding 
the protection of health, safety, environment or other public interests (c.f. essential 
requirements). Furthermore, MRAs may pave the way for a more harmonized 
system of standardization and certifications and more regulatory coherence and 
transparency between the involved parties.  
The main objectives of MRAs are to remove trade barriers caused by duplicate 
testing, certification etc. and thus to improve market access and increase trade. 
EUs experience shows however, that MRAs can be costly and difficult to maintain 
and that improvements in market access are not guaranteed. I will come back to 
this experience later. 
                                           
 10 See homepage of DG Enterprise and Industry 
(http://www.eu.int/comm/enterprise/international) and DG Trade 2006. 
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In addition to negotiating MRAs with third countries, the EU has also used mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment as a tool in and important step of the 
accession process of new EU members. These agreements are called Protocols on 
European Conformity Assessment (PECAs) and are related to the implementation 
of EUs technical regulations in candidate countries (European Commission 1998). 
PECAs are quite similar to MRAs. However, there are some important differences. 
The most obvious difference is of course that candidate countries eventually will 
become EU members and thus that they will be bound to implement all relevant 
EU legislation concerning conformity assessment as well as product regulations and 
standards.  
Thus, under a PECA the Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs) will necessarily 
check compliance with EU rules, and these rules will eventually become the 
legislation of the candidate country. Under an MRA CABs will check whether the 
exported products comply with the importing countrys requirements. However, in 
contrast to PECAs there is no prerequisite that these requirements become part of 
the exporting countrys legislation. 
The practical result of both MRAs and PECAs is that the Designating 
Authorities of the contracting Parties must ensure that suitable CABs can operate 
in accordance with the criteria and procedures of the other Partys regulations as 
specified in the text of the Agreement. However, as already indicated, in the case of 
PECAs the criteria used will also be identical to the EU directives, which further-
more are supposed to be implemented in the corresponding candidate countries 
legislation. PECAs are thus transitional arrangements, where the aim is to 
accommodate and incorporate the conformity assessment systems of new members 
into EUs common regulatory framework.  
 
Equivalence is one of the trade facilitating tools applied by the EU in its third- 
country relations. However, as noted by the European Commission, although a 
powerful tool, this mechanism can be technically complex in practise, which 
explains why it is relatively little used (European Commission 2001a: 12). Equiva-
lence assessments mean that the objective of a regulation must be set out. Then 
agreement must be reached on the equivalence of two or more regulations/con-
formity assessment procedures, i.e. agreement that they be able to accomplish the 
same objective. Finally an agreement must be reached about their mutual 
acceptability. This process must be very detailed, i.e. it must be carried out on a 
sector-by-sector and case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the need for substantial 
revision or updating means that a new determination of recognition and equiva-
lence is necessary. For these reasons, the European Commission realizes that the 
principle of equivalence cannot be considered generally applicable.  
Thus, in practise there is not one EU approach to equivalence, but many 
approaches depending on the sectors and products involved. Furthermore, equiva-
lence assessments have been more widely used in the area of sanitary and phyto-
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sanitary measures (SPS measures), where health protection normally is the core 
objective, than in the area of technical regulations and standards (TBT measures), 
where a whole range of objectives are involved.  
Thus, in the SPS area it is easier to identify a parameter against which different 
regulations can be assessed. But even in this area, it has proven hard to reach 
agreement on equivalency, and to maintain such agreement over time. 
Nevertheless, the EU has some experience both in determining equivalence for 
specific product groups, such as in the organic food area, and in reaching more 
comprehensive equivalence agreements, such as in the veterinary area. To date, the 
EU has in place veterinary equivalency agreements (VEAs) with the U.S. (1999), 
Canada (1998), New Zealand (1996) and Chile (2002). Furthermore, negotiations 
are ongoing with Australia and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay). 
In the following sections, I present some examples of EUs application of both 
equivalence and mutual recognition. 
 
 
Organic farming represented only around 3 percent of the total EU utilised agri-
cultural area in 2000, but has nevertheless developed into one of the most dynamic 
agricultural sectors in the EU.11 The organic farm sector grew by about 25 percent 
a year between 1993 and 1998 and is estimated to have grown by around 
30 percent a year since 1998. As a result of increased consumer awareness of and 
demand for organically grown products tens of thousands of farms have been 
converted to this system. Furthermore, the demand for organic products has also 
led to increased imports, both directly for consumption and as inputs for EUs 
organic food processing industry. A significant proportion of the increased imports 
come from developing countries. 
The EU rules on organic farming came into force in 1992 and contain, inter alia, 
provisions governing trade in organic products with third countries. The EU rules 
furthermore include provisions on the application of equivalence assessments as 
tools to facilitate trade in organic products. For the time being, these rules are 
mainly relevant for imports into the EU.  
Article 11 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 provides an equivalency 
regime for organic products imported from third countries (European Commission 
2004: 28). This provision states that it must be demonstrated that imported organic 
products are produced and inspected in accordance with prevailing standards and 
are subject to inspection arrangements that are equivalent to those which are applied 
                                           
 11 See homepage of DG Agriculture: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/qual/organic/ 
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to organic production in the EU. The equivalency regime covers thus both product 
and production requirements and conformity assessment procedures. 
The EU had in operation until 2006 two different systems for imports of organic 
products concerning assessment and determination of equivalency (ibid.): 
 
  Article 11(1) states that for imported organic products to be 
marketed as organic in the EU they must originate from a third country 
that appears on a list drawn up by the European Commission. Until 2003 
this list included eight third countries and nine more applications were 
then assessed.12 
 Article 11(6) states that Member States can on a case-by-case 
basis and upon the request of an importer authorise the marketing in the 
EU of a consignment of imported products as organic. This second 
system was derogated from the first system and was supposed to be in 
operation until 31 December 2005. The majority of the imports of organic 
products, originating in 92 countries, passed through this second system. 
The number of import authorisations under the system rose from 599 in 
1998 to 1248 in 2002. 
 
In December 2005 the European Commission presented a proposal for a new 
Council Regulation on organic production and labelling of organic products. This 
regulation will amend Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 on organic production of 
agricultural products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products and 
foodstuffs. 
The proposal recommends that the second system of the equivalency regime will 
cease to exist. If the new regulation is adopted, the equivalent guarantees will be 
provided by third-country authorities or certified EU-approved control bodies 
only. Thus, EU Member States will have their authority reduced regarding determi-
ning whether imported products can be marketed as organic. The first system 
involving a community list of third countries will however be maintained. 
The proposed new regulation further states that equivalency assessments can be 
based on either relevant international standards (Codex Alimentarius standards) or 
on the Community regulations. It is thus clearly stated that imported products can 
be marketed as organic in the EU, even though they have been produced according 
to requirements that differ from EU legislation. However, the products must have 
been produced, controlled and inspected under conditions that are sufficiently 
equivalent to the corresponding requirements stated in either EU rules or the 
Codex standards. 
 
                                           
 12 The eight countries that appeared on the list were Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand and Switzerland. Since then, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary have become EU members and are thus no longer considered as third countries. The 
nine applications that were assessed were from Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, India, Japan, Tunisia, Turkey and the United States of America. 
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After six years of negotiations, the EU and the U.S. finally signed the Veterinary 
Equivalency Agreement (VEA) on July 20, 1999. The framework and wording of 
this agreement are quite similar to those found in EUs agreements with New 
Zealand and Canada (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2005).The equivalency 
agreement between the EU and Chile is, however, somewhat different; thus, I will 
first briefly comment upon some of the specificities of that agreement. 
Contrary to EUs other equivalency agreements, the EU-Chile VEA is not an 
independent document but is set out in an annex of a more comprehensive 
Association Agreement between the two parties (ibid). The EU-Chile VEA also 
includes some elements that are not found in the other VEAs, such as animal 
welfare standards. The agreement is explicitly linked to the WTOs SPS Agreement 
and thus specifies in a more formal way than the other agreements the deference to 
the provisions of that agreement. Furthermore, it does not, whereas the other 
agreements do, contain a comprehensive list of individual products and equivalency 
ratings attributed to each product (ibid.). Rather the EU-Chile VEA only includes 
guidance for the process of determining equivalency. Thus, the other VEAs are more 
detailed with regard to identifying specific products traded between the contracting 
parties and the status of equivalency ratings for those products. 
The VEA between the EU and the U.S. is a particularly important agreement for 
the facilitation of international trade, especially because of the extensive trade 
volume that exists between the two parties. The EU and the U.S. are the leading 
participants in international trade, accounting between them for about 37% of 
world merchandise trade and 45% of world trade in services (European 
Commission 2001b: Chapter 1, A5).  
The VEA covers two-way trade in various animal products, including fishery 
products, valued at about $3 billion annually (Becker 1999). It includes a list of all 
the individual products that are covered by the agreement, and each of the 
products is assigned a level of equivalency for the respective requirements attached 
to it. The rankings are listed in Table 3.2 below (USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service 2005: 5): 
 
Trade Facilitation through Equivalence and Mutual Recognition: The EU Model 
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute / Centre for Food Policy, 2006 
25
 
Yes 1 is the highest degree of equivalency that can be achieved under the agree-
ment and implies that trade can occur without impediments caused by the require-
ments evaluated (c.f. full equivalency). The other two rankings involving agreed 
equivalence (Yes 2 and Yes 3) set out special conditions for trade to occur. Table 
3.3 lists the occurrence of different types of equivalency rankings under the 
veterinary agreement (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2005: 5). 
 
The total of rankings for the EU is not the same as that for the U.S. given the 
unique breakdown of commodities (i.e. classification of products) by the two 
parties. Table 3.3 shows that the EU has achieved considerably more of the two 
highest equivalency rankings (Yes 1 and Yes 2) than the U.S. However, one has to 
be cautious in putting too much weight on this finding. Information about the 
relative trade significance of each product is needed in order to make a more 
comprehensive evaluation. The number of equivalency rankings does not say 
anything about the value or quantity of trade in these products. Furthermore, 
because of the structure of the agreement it is difficult to estimate accurately the 
trade implications of the agreements equivalency rankings. 
USDAs Foreign Agricultural Service has nevertheless made some attempts at 
determining the trade impact of the EU-U.S. VEA (USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service 2005). It has compared data on trade in all the products covered by the 
VEA from the year the agreement went into effect (1999) against data on trade in 
all such products for every year up to and including 2004. The data shows that in 
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the period 19992004 the trade of such products from the EU to the U.S. and vice 
versa increased in value: 
 
Thus, the value of trade in all such products has increased in the period 19992004 
for both parties to the agreement. The data further indicate a clear increase in the 
value of trade in the products with the highest equivalency ranking (YES 1 
products). Table 3.4 shows a clear increase in U.S. exports to the EU. This is largely 
caused by increased exports of high value Yes 1 products such as fish. 
However, when we look at trade volume measured in quantities, the picture 
changes somewhat. This is partly caused by the fact that fluctuations in exchange 
rates affect fluctuation in trade value and thus disturb the total picture. As for U.S. 
exports, quantities increased significantly in only a very few categories, namely live 
animals, fish, dairy products and bird eggs, products of animal origin NESOI13, and 
raw hides and bovine skins. The increase in the value of EU exports to the U.S. is 
not reflected by a corresponding increase in the quantity of exports. However, 
there has been an increase even in export quantities in the categories of meat and 
edible meat offal, food preparations NESOI, and Casein. 
Thus, for important YES 1 products such as fish products from the U.S. and 
meat and edible meat offal products from the EU, the positive effect of the VEA 
on trade seems to hold, even when exports in such products are measured in 
quantities. 
However, according to officials of both the European Commission and the U.S., 
handling the veterinary agreement has not been an easy endeavour.14 
 
 First, the negotiations were difficult and time-consuming, lasting more than 
six years.  
 Second, the parties did not succeed in including in the agreement one of the 
most important traded products between the parties, namely poultry. 
Because of strong disagreement over hygiene requirements for poultry 
production, trade in this product has been more or less halted until now, 
despite the fact that the VEA originally was supposed to solve the problem 
                                           
 13 NESOI = Not Elsewhere Specified Or Indicated 
 14 Interviews conducted with officials of the European Commissions DG SANCO and the 
U.S. Mission to the European Union, Brussels, October 2005. 
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by including this product category. The dispute was even brought to the 
WTO and for many years it was subject to consultations between the parties 
under WTO procedures. 
 Third, it is difficult to uphold equivalency determinations over time, due to 
changes in circumstances and the fact that national requirements 
continuously are updated.  
 Fourth, it has proved difficult to perform new equivalency determinations 
under the agreement. Determination of equivalency has been performed for 
only two new product categories since the agreement went into force in 
1999. 
 Fifth, differences in how the sanitary and phytosanitary area is being 
organized in the EU and the U.S. have also caused some problems regarding 
the administration of the equivalency agreement. 
 
In the following sections I will elaborate further on the last point. Both EU and 
U.S. officials have stressed that it is important with regard to how and whether the 
equivalency agreement works. How policies are organized and handled nationally 
may generally have important repercussions for both the negotiation process and 
the follow-up of equivalency agreements.  
In the EU all VEAs are administered by the European Commissions DG 
SANCO. This is in accordance with the implementation of major reforms in EUs 
food regulation in recent years whereby responsibilities for food safety policies 
have ended up as the responsibility of DG SANCO (see also next chapter). Hence, 
because the primary responsibility for the sanitary and phytosanitary area and 
VEAs is placed in DG SANCO, the other parties to EUs VEAs (the countries 
themselves) only have to relate to one single authority regarding follow-up of the 
agreements (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2005: 4).  
With regard to monitoring the sanitary equivalency of a product traded between 
the EU and the U.S., there is a delineation of responsibility according to whether 
the product is being imported or exported (ibid.). The primary responsibilities for 
EU exports to the U.S. lie with the individual member state involved in the 
exportation. These responsibilities include the control of production requirements 
and the issuing of health certificates. EU Member States must either conform to 
the standards of the importing country, or alternatively base the exports on 
possibly agreed equivalency determinations with this country. 
The Member States have also retained important tasks and responsibilities with 
regard to imports, but in this area they are primarily charged with complying with 
EU regulations. The EU has a comprehensive set of harmonized legislation which 
regulates imports of food and veterinary products from third countries and is 
enforced through customs and border inspections (ibid; Ugland and Veggeland 
2004). Thus, in this area national customs and food inspection authorities act as 
agents of the European Commission, which is the supreme authority for regulating 
imports into the Single European Market (Ugland and Veggeland 2006). 
The structure of the U.S. regulatory systems stands out in stark contrast to EUs 
single authority structure (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2005: 4). Depending 
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on the product being traded, responsibilities for domestically produced as well as 
imported veterinary products, encompass nine agencies: 
 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
 Department of Interior (DOI) 
 Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
 Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) 
 Department of Commerce (DOC) 
 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
 Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). 
 
Thus, there are big differences between the EU and U.S. regulatory systems. EUs 
system is characterized by a demarcation of responsibilities along the lines of 
imported vs. exported products as well as by a horizontally integrated food safety 
system where all the primary responsibility for food imports and for consumer and 
health protection is placed within a single agency, DG SANCO. Furthermore, in 
line with this structure there is a clear separation of, on the one side, the quality, 
technical and commercial aspects of food regulation and, on the other side, the 
health and consumer protection aspects. The U.S. system is more fragmented and 
characterized by a number of different agencies with jurisdiction over different 
products. Thus, demarcation of responsibilities in the U.S. runs along the lines of 
the products being traded.  
This creates a mismatch between the EU and U.S. systems, which sometimes 
lead to communication problems as well as to problems with maintaining trust and 
confidence in each others systems.15 Furthermore, due to a similar mismatch, 
similar problems have occurred under yet another important agreement between 
the EU and the U.S., namely the Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) of 1998. 
 
The MRA between the EU and the U.S. was signed in 1998 and that same year a 
three years transitional phase was inaugurated by an exchange of letters under the 
agreement (Horton 1998: 723). The agreement was the result of several years of 
activities involving the European Commission and the relevant U.S. regulatory 
agencies, in particular the FDA, aimed at establishing mutual recognition of one 
anothers inspections.  
At the behest of the European Commission, talks with the relevant U.S. 
regulatory agencies were initiated as early as 1992 and it was clear early on that 
mutual recognition could be applied only to product testing (c.f. conformity assess-
ment); it could not be applied to the setting of product standards (Steffenson 
2002). The MRA does not, therefore, acknowledge the equivalence of the Parties 
                                           
 15 Interviews with EU and U.S. officials. 
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standards but rather the competence of the Parties to conduct conformity assess-
ment tests (ibid.).  
The establishment of the EU-U.S. MRA can be viewed as a policy transfer from 
the EU to the transatlantic marketplace because the principle of mutual recognition 
has been most developed and the use of MRAs has been most extensive within the 
internal market (ibid.) (see also chapter 2 of this report). Furthermore, as already 
indicated, the talks were initiated by the EU. 
The MRA negotiations were carried out between the European Commission and 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and included confor-
mity assessments for drugs and medical devices, telecommunications, electro-
magnetic compatibility, electrical safety and recreational craft. The basis for the 
agreement was the slogan and principle approved once, approved everywhere 
(Egan 2001: 185). In order to facilitate the negotiations of the MRA some contro-
versial issues were taken off the table. For instance the negotiations on pharma-
ceuticals focused mainly on the exchange of inspection reports concerning 
compliance with Good Manufacturing Practises (GMPs)16 (Egan 2001: 189).  
The assumption is that an MRA may contribute to considerably reducing 
transaction costs, which, as in the case of VEAs in the veterinary area, is potentially 
of great benefit to both the EU and the U.S. because of the large volume of trade 
involved. An MRA including telecommunications and recreational crafts was con-
sidered to be particularly advantageous to the U.S. whereas an MRA including 
pharmaceuticals was considered to be particularly advantageous to the EU.  
The negotiated MRA can thus be viewed as a balanced package comprising 
several sectoral annexes and taking both Parties interests into consideration. It is 
furthermore important to note that the agreement was facilitated by the fact that 
the EU and the U.S. already had harmonized parts of their requirements in 
advance, for instance some of the GMPs for pharmaceuticals (Horton 1998: 723). 
Nevertheless, it was realized that considerable confidence-building work and 
harmonization was needed in order for the follow-up of the agreement to be 
effective. 
The EU-U.S. MRA consists of an umbrella/framework agreement and six indivi-
dual annexes (see table 3.5). 
                                           
 16 Good Manufacturing Practise: A Practise related to the proactive steps that are taken to 
ensure that products are safe, pure, and effective. This requires a quality approach to manu-
facturing, enabling companies to minimize or eliminate instances of contamination, mix-ups, 
and errors. This in turn protects the consumer from purchasing a product which is ineffective 
or even dangerous. 
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17
  
As illustrated by Table 3.5, only three of the sectoral annexes are really in 
operation. There is significant trade under the Annex on telecommunications and 
the Annex on electromagnetic compatibility, which are both in full operation and 
under which a considerable number of CABs have been designated (DG Trade 
2006). However, the EU adopted in 2004 new rules in the field of electromagnetic 
compatibility that imposes no third-party certification obligations on manu-
facturers. This means that the Annex will be needed only for the EU's access to the 
U.S. market and not vice versa.  
The Annex on recreational craft is in operation with one designated CAB, but 
new EU rules also in this area mean that either the Annex has to be either revised 
or it has to be dropped altogether. 
The operation of the Annex on pharmaceutical GMPs awaits the FDAs 
presentation of an implementation plan.  
The EUs obligations under the Annex on electrical safety remain suspended due 
to the position of the U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA).  
The Annex on medical devices has not become operational yet due to problems 
with regard to the acceptance of CABs, which can subsequently be listed under the 
MRA. 
The EU-U.S. MRA thus illustrates both some of the problems and some of the 
benefits with regard to applying and maintaining MRAs as trade facilitating tools. 
Mutual recognition is a concept which has been particularly well developed 
within the EU and which furthermore has been successfully transferred to both 
EUs own third-country relations and even to other bilateral and multilateral trade 
relations. This transfer of ideas from the EU is clearly evident in the EU-U.S. 
MRA, which was negotiated on the EU's initiative. 
The EU experience furthermore shows that comprehensive MRAs are often 
difficult to negotiate and that they moreover presuppose from the outset some 
compatibility between the Parties regulatory systems. Thus, MRAs seem to be 
most relevant as a trade facilitating tools when applied between Parties with 
relatively well developed bureaucratic infrastructures and regulatory systems. 
Nevertheless, the operation of the EU-U.S. MRA shows that even in such cases 
many problems will arise. 
                                           
 17 See DG Trade 2006. 
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The experience with the EU-U.S. MRA also shows that asymmetries between 
regulatory systemseven between well-developed ones such as the EU and U.S. 
systemsrepresent big challenges with regard to creating sufficient trust and 
confidence in Parties different approaches to regulation and in Parties abilities to 
perform satisfactorily inspections and controls.  
The regulatory systems of the EU and the U.S. show asymmetries in that 
responsibilities and authority are differently located and distributed between 
governmental and private agencies. Furthermore, in the U.S. the large number of 
involved agenciesall with superior authority in their respective area of 
competence and all with their own regulatory cultures and ways of seeing and doing 
thingscreates a fragmented system which makes it difficult to uniformly 
implement regulatory changes. The U.S. regulatory agencies furthermore have a 
tradition of carrying out their tasks relatively independently of ministerial control, 
which may cause problems for the designation of CABs and for the acceptance of 
other Parties methods of product approvals.  
The EU regulatory system is less fragmented and thus characterized by a more 
active and consistent hierarchical control. However, the multilevel decision-making 
process of the EU and the need for approval of the Council in a large number of 
decisions imply a lack of flexibility and time-consuming amendments to agreements 
with third countries.  
Thus, differences in the characteristics of these two regulatory systems create 
anomalies that complicate negotiations, amendments and maintenance of the 
MRAs. 
As already indicated, the operation of MRAs is furthermore complicated by the 
fact that changes in the relevant legislation of one of the Parties may require 
amendments to and revisions of the MRA itself. Thus, MRAs need to be conti-
nuously updated through new negotiations and discussions, which may prove 
difficult and time-consuming and may even lead to a situation where parts of the 
agreement are suspended or dropped altogether, as has occurred in the EU-U.S. 
MRA. 
Thus, even though the EU and the U.S. spent significant time and resources in 
preparations, and eventually succeeded in negotiating a framework MRA, its 
operation in specific sectors, i.e. the sectoral annexes, has proven very difficult, inter 
alia, because of the factors mentioned above. 
Partly because of such problems, the European Commission has stated that it 
does not foresee further negotiations on traditional MRAs, even though there is 
a certain amount of evolution in existing MRAs, inter alia, through amendments 
(DG Trade 2006).  
Instead the European Commission aims at establishing less ambitious and less 
comprehensive regulatory agreements. It furthermore wants to explore some of the 
softer approaches to better regulation, i.e. by being more active in entering into 
regulatory dialogue and formal and informal regulatory cooperation with third 
countries. 
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The EU has a number of trade facilitating tools that are being used in its third- 
country trade relations. An important characteristic of EUs model of trade 
facilitation is the extensive use of the principles (tools) of equivalency and mutual 
recognition. The EU has been a pioneer in applying these tools to external trade 
and has furthermore been active in transferring them to a global setting. Thus, the 
EU has negotiated a number of equivalency agreements and MRAs with third 
countries and has therefore been one of the key initiators and contributors to the 
work on equivalency and mutual recognition in international bodies such as the 
WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Furthermore, the EU model and 
the EU experience with applying this model have been important in setting the 
global agenda and moving it forward in international negotiations and discussions.  
It is important to note however that requirements for compliance with EU rules 
still dominate EUs third-country trade relations, particularly those regarding trade 
in food and veterinary products. 
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As illustrated in Chapter 3, the EU has been active in promoting and transferring 
the principles of equivalence and mutual recognition in both bilateral and global 
settings through negotiations on bilateral trade agreements in particular. 
Furthermore, the EU has also pursued these issues in relevant international fora 
such as the WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. In this chapter, I will 
explore further the role EU has played in these two international bodies regarding 
the understanding and application of the principles of equivalency and mutual 
recognition. First however, I will describe how the EU organizes its representation 
of common positions in international bodies in order to demonstrate the EUs 
capacity for transferring its trade facilitation model. I particularly focus on food 
policies, an area where the international discussions on trade facilitation and 
equivalence in particular, have been extensive. 
 
Since its very beginning, the European Economic Community (EEC) has been a 
single actor in trade policy (Meunier 2005: 5). Thus, the EEC, later the EC 
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(European Community),18  was a full member of the GATT and is presently a full 
member of its successor, the WTO.19 This implies that the EU representatives, 
normally the European Commission, speak on behalf of all the Member States in 
this forum. The EU Member States are also members of the WTO and are 
represented in WTO meetings, but they are not allowed to speak on those matters 
that are within the competence of the EU institutions. 
The WTOs SPS Agreement and TBT Agreements both entered into force in 
1995. The SPS Agreement covers measures aimed at protecting public health 
through food safety, and measures aimed at protecting animal and plant life, and 
health. The TBT Agreement covers technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures. Both agreements are relevant for the food sector. The SPS 
Agreement is relevant for food safety measures particularly, such as rules for food 
additives. The TBT Agreement is relevant for all product groups, including food. 
Examples of TBT-related food regulations and standards are rules for labelling, 
packaging, and organic food production.  
Both agreements state that WTO members can fulfil their obligations by basing 
national rules on recognized international standards. The SPS Agreement explicitly 
refers to three international standardization bodies: Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion for food safety standards, OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) for 
animal health standards and IPPC (International Plant Protection Convention) for 
plant health standards. The TBT Agreement refers more generally to relevant 
international standards.  
Thus, due to both agreements the work in international standardization bodies 
has achieved higher status and attracted more attention from all WTO members, 
particularly because of the possible consequences of ending up in WTO disputes if 
trade-restrictive national food regulations disagree with recognized international 
standards (Veggeland and Borgen 2005). Thus, regarding food policies, co-
ordinating the activities taking place in meetings of the SPS and TBT Committees, 
and in international standardization bodies, has become more important. Below, I 
will focus on the EUs representation on the SPS Committee and in Codex, 
because these fora are of particular relevance for the food sector.  
When the SPS Agreement came into effect in 1995, the European Commissions 
DG Agriculture was initially responsible for the SPS area and thus headed the EU 
delegation to SPS meetings and acted as enquiry point under the agreement. 
Thus, for some years the DG Agriculture spoke and acted on behalf of the EU in 
SPS Committee meetings. After a while DG Trade also became part of the delega-
tion on a regular basis. 
DG Enterprise/Industry is enquiry point under the TBT Agreement and has 
headed the EU delegation to TBT Committee meetings. DG Trade is also part of 
this delegation. DG Enterprise/Industry is thus a core player regarding both the 
work on new approach standardisation, technical regulations and the use of the 
mutual recognition principle internally in the EU, and the work on aspects 
                                           
 18 For simplicitys sake we use the term European Union (EU) even when EC or EEC is 
formally the correct term. 
 19 WTO succeeded GATT in 1995. 
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regarding technical trade barriers in third-country relations, including MRAs. DG 
Enterprise/Industry is thus heavily involved in areas that are also relevant for the 
food sector, i.e. non-SPS aspects of technical regulations and standards. DG Trade 
is responsible for aspects regarding the promotion of EUs export interests.  
The Codex Alimentarius Commission was established in 1963 and thereafter 
DG Agriculture and DG Enterprise/Industry normally met as EUs representatives 
in Codex meetings. However, until 2003 the EU only had observer status in this 
forum whereas the EU Member States had full participatory rights. Thus, it was a 
representative from one of the Member States who spoke on behalf of the EU on 
those areas covered by EU law.  
In 2003 through a vote, the Codex Commission agreed on the accession of the 
EU to full-member status in Codex. After the Council of the European Union on 
17 November 2003 decided that the EU should become a member of Codex the 
European Commission began acting on behalf of the EU Member States. Thus in 
Codex, as is the case in the SPS Committee, the Commission now speaks and acts 
on behalf of the Member States in areas covered by EU law.20 However, in contrast 
to the situation in the SPS Committee, the Member States are allowed to take part 
in discussions at Codex meetings. Furthermore, representatives of the Secretariat of 
the Council of Ministers may occasionally also attend both WTO and Codex 
meetings. 
It was not until 6 October 2005 that the EU became a Contracting Party to the 
IPPC. It is still not a member of OIE, but through an exchange of letters in 2004 it 
has established official relations with the OIE and participates in OIE meetings as 
an observer.  
After the BSE crisis hit the EU in the mid-1990s the EU implemented extensive 
institutional reforms of the European Commission, including reforms of the 
Commissions external representation of EUs food policies. DG SANCO took 
over the leading and coordinating role in EUs food safety work, both within the 
Commission and the Council and in on-the-spot co-ordination meetings in WTO, 
Codex and other international fora where the EU is represented. Thus, today DG 
SANCO acts as both enquiry point under the SPS Agreement and as contact point 
for Codex matters. Because Codex is a decision-making body, a formalized set of 
procedures for co-ordination between the EU Member States, involving DG 
SANCO, has been put in place in a Council working group. 
The SPS Committee, however, is not a decision-making body. Nevertheless, DG 
SANCO has chosen to initiate co-ordinating meetings with the EU members 
before SPS Committee meetings. The co-ordinations involved take place in a 
Commission working group. DG SANCO is furthermore responsible for co-
ordinating and following up OIE and IPPC issues within the EU as well as in the 
meetings of the respective international bodies. The EU has thus responded on the 
                                           
 20 The EU has established a set of complex procedures for guiding voting by the European 
Commission and the EU member states should vote in Codex whereby their voting will 
depend on whether the issues on the agenda are within the Community competence, Member 
State competence or a mixed competence. However, I will not go further into these 
procedures here. 
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international level by giving main responsibility for EU work on international food 
policies to DG SANCO, which subsequently also takes the lead in the EUs SPS 
work, including related activities towards Codex, OIE and IPPC.  
Today, DG SANCO heads the EU Delegation to the SPS Committee and DG 
SANCO delegates normally attend meetings together with delegates from DG 
Trade. As a rule, the two DGs share the SPS work between them in the following 
way: DG SANCO has the main responsibility for EUs SPS work and speaks on 
those matters that are related to explaining EUs food safety policies, sharing EUs 
experiences in the food safety area with other WTO members, and defending EUs 
SPS measures that are challenged by other WTO members. DG Trade becomes 
involved when the EU raises trade concerns regarding other WTO members SPS 
measures, i.e. on issues regarding external trade.  
This division of labour in the SPS area illustrates EUs attempts at separating 
institutionally the responsibilities for issues based on food safety and health 
objectives from issues based on EUs commercial and trade interests. Thus, DG 
SANCO is supposed to work towards the SPS Committee within the single 
mandate of health and consumer protection whereas DG Trade is supposed to take 
care of the trade mandate of promoting market access for EUs exports. Generally, 
the division of labour between DG SANCO, DG Enterprise/Industry and DG 
Trade illustrates EUs attempts at creating a coherent and consistent regulatory 
system where, to the extent possible, designated agencies are given clearly defined 
and sole responsibility for promoting specific objectives such that they (the 
agencies) will not easily come into conflict or duplicate efforts. 
The EU has responded to the developments in international food regulations 
(and other international product regulations) in several ways: 
 First, it has itself carried out extensive reforms in its regulatory frame-
work. In the food policy area, these reforms have been largely motivated 
by other factors, especially the BSE crisis, but have nevertheless been 
adjusted to the international developments. 
 Second, the EU has become a full member of other relevant international 
bodies such as the Codex and the IPPC in the same way that it is a full 
member of the WTO. Furthermore, in some cases the European 
Commission has established formal relations with other relevant interna-
tional bodies, although it has not joined them, e.g. OIE. 
 Third, the EU has made an effort at clarifying the responsibilities for 
different regulatory areas according to the objectives that it seeks to 
achieve. Thus, responsibilities for all food safety activities have been 
placed under the responsibility of DG SANCO, which works under the 
single mandate of promoting health and consumer objectives. DG 
SANCO is also responsible for coordinating food policies internally 
before bringing them before the SPS Committee and the meetings of 
Codex, OIE and IPPC. The responsibility for the non-SPS area (the TBT 
area) of food regulation is however left to DG Enterprise/Industry. 
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In this way the EU has enhanced its capacity for coordinating its work on 
international regulations in general and on food regulations in particular. 
Furthermore, the EU has enhanced its capacity for promoting coherently and 
consistently its regulatory work internationally. This is particularly true for the food 
sector where the EU has established a food regulation system which creates 
coherency between how this policy area is integrated within the EU and how it is 
represented and promoted within the WTO and the three standardization bodies: 
Codex, OIE and IPPC. The EUs external representation of food policies has thus 
become integrated institutionally in a way that enhances the promotion of common 
and coherent EU food policies in the international arena. EUs external represent-
tation furthermore involves attempts at insulating the promotion of food safety 
policies from the parallel promotion of EUs trade and commercial interests (c.f. 
the division of labour between DG SANCO and DG Trade in the SPS 
Committee). 
 
The EU is an important player in the WTO (and was likewise in GATT before 
that), and has acted as a collective entity in trade policies ever since 1957 when the 
Treaty of Rome was signed and the EU gained exclusive competence to negotiate 
and enter into international trade agreements (Meunier 2005). 
From 1995, when the SPS Agreement and TBT Agreements came into force, the 
EU has actively promoted its regulatory policies and approaches in the WTO 
context, including the use of trade-facilitating tools such as equivalence and mutual 
recognition. The discussions and submissions on these issues have mainly taken 
place in the TBT Committee, where DG Enterprise/Industry co-ordinates EUs 
positions in advance and leads the EU delegation, and the SPS Committee, where 
DG SANCO co-ordinates the positions and leads the EU delegation.21 
 
The TBT Agreement has three main provisions which deal with mutual recognition 
and equivalence and which are all assumed to be useful tools to facilitate trade 
under the agreement: 
 
   Members shall 
give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations 
of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, 
provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfil the 
objectives of their own regulations. 
 
                                           
 21 See Veggeland and Elvestad (2004) for a more comprehensive presentation of the discus-
sions in the TBT and SPS Committees on equivalence and mutual recognition over the years. 
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Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4, Members 
shall ensure, whenever possible, that results of conformity assessment 
procedures in other Members are accepted, even when those procedures 
differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that those procedures 
offer an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or 
standards equivalent to their own procedures. It is recognized that prior 
consultations may be necessary in order to arrive at a mutually satisfactory 
understanding regarding, in particular: 
 
 Members are encouraged, at 
the request of other Members, to be willing to enter into negotiations for 
the conclusion of agreements for the mutual recognition of results of each 
other's conformity assessment procedures.  Members may require that 
such agreements fulfil the criteria of paragraph 1 and give mutual satis-
faction regarding their potential for facilitating trade in the products con-
cerned. 
 
The TBT Committee has initiated work to clarify how these provisions can be 
understood and applied in practise, but the work has proved difficult. Discussions 
on how to determine equivalence for technical regulations (c.f. Article 2.7) has been 
particularly hard to move forward. The TBT Committee has for many years 
repeatedly invited Members to exchange views on their experiences in the imple-
mentation of Article 2.7, which relates to equivalence of technical regulations. Still, 
it has seemed very difficult to identify practical examples of how such equivalence 
determinations have facilitated trade.  
Greater progress has been made in the discussions on the other two provisions, 
namely articles 6.1 and 6.3. Several Members stress that these provisions touch 
upon elements that have proven to be important trade facilitating tools in many 
product sectors. Article 6.1 deals exclusively with the recognition of conformity 
assessment by central government bodies. Compared to Article 2.7, it provides 
greater details on the means of implementation. In fact, mutual recognition of the 
equivalency of conformity assessment procedures is included as a core element in 
many MRAs, whereas mutual recognition of the equivalency of the technical 
regulations seldom is.  
In line with Article 6.3 of the TBT Agreement the Members have been requested 
to notify the TBT Committee of MRAs in which they take part. Up until 2005 
about 40 MRAs concerning the results of conformity assessment procedures had 
been notified to the Committee (WTO 2005:18). About half (46 percent) of these 
notifications were from the European region (ibid.: 19). Thus, with regard to 
equivalence and mutual recognition, the main focus of the TBT Committee seems 
to have become MRAs and conformity assessment procedures. As we will see, this 
is also in line with the approach taken by the European Union in this field. 
The most comprehensive submission which the EU has made to the TBT 
Committee in this field is the communication from the European Commission 
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entitled A Policy Framework for the Facilitation of Trade in the Fields of 
Standardization and Conformity Assessment: A Toolbox of Instruments (WTO 
2002b), which is actually identical to the working document (European 
Commission 2001a) of the Commission presented earlier in this report. This sub-
mission covers many areas relevant to the regulatory work on trade facilitation. 
The European Commission stated that the objective of submitting this 
document to the TBT Committee was to share with other WTO Members the 
European Communitys experience in external trade in the fields of standards and 
conformity assessment, and present a framework for our future work in this area 
(WTO 2002a). 
In its communication the Commission underlines that its experiences have led to 
the view that a broad variety of measures can be applied to accomplish trade facili-
tation and furthermore it refers to several important (ideal) conditions for open 
trade (WTO 2002b: 3):  
 Compatibility of approach 
 Coherence of regulations and standards 
 Transparency of rules 
 Appropriate levels and means of regulation 
 Impartiality in certification 
 Compatibility of market surveillance measures and supervision practises 
 Appropriate level of technical and administrative infrastructure. 
 
The Commission explains that the EU applies a variety of measures together with 
its trading partners, including equivalence and mutual recognition agreements, to 
bring about these ideal conditions. The Commission furthermore intends in its 
submission to the TBT Committee to ..facilitate the identification and develop-
ment of priorities for action in the field, in such a way as to be as effective and 
cost-efficient as possible (WTO 2002b: 4).  
The Communication was intended to deal with issues of external trade in 
industrial products, but the Commission stresses that the issues that are raised may 
also have implications for trade in other areas, for example agricultural products, 
where the issues are often similar although existing regulatory modalities are 
generally different. The Commission nevertheless emphasizes that it is important to 
note that the application of concepts to areas or sectors will depend on the specific 
regulatory framework existing in each case. Of course, this is also true when 
applying the concepts in cases concerning states with divergent regulatory frame-
works. 
In the following sections I will point out some of the elements of the document 
Implementing Policy for External Trade in the Fields of Standards and 
Conformity Assessment: A Tool Box of Instruments (European Commission 
2001a) relevant to the TBT discussions (see also Chapter 3 of this report). The 
Commission states in this document that it is important to bear in mind that the 
concepts contained in the TBT Agreement cannot be applied to global markets in 
the same manner that they are applied to EUs internal market. The main reason 
 
Trade Facilitation through Equivalence and Mutual Recognition: The EU Model 
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute / Centre for Food Policy, 2006 
40 
for this is the absence of a strong institutional framework at the global level to 
support applying them in such a manner (WTO 2001b:6). In other words, the fact 
that the WTO lacks strong legislative and administrative bodiessuch as the 
Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the European 
Commissionand judicial controlsuch as that exercised by the European Court 
of Justicemakes it important to apply a different mix of trade facilitation tools 
than the mix which is used by the EU itself. The trade facilitating tools envisaged 
by the Commission are listed in Table 3.1 of this report. 
Several important points are worth mentioning with regard to the European 
Commissions inputs into the discussions in the TBT Committee.  
First, the Commission seems to be somewhat reserved as to applying the 
concept of equivalence of technical regulations under the TBT Agreement (c.f. 
Article 2.7). It recognizes that when it can be applied, it can be a valuable instru-
ment of trade facilitation, but also states that because of the complexities involved 
the principle of equivalence cannot be considered to be of general applicability. 
Second, the Commission seems to be positive towards the work in the TBT 
Committee on clarifying how to achieve and apply mutual recognition of the 
equivalency of conformity assessment procedures (c.f. Articles 6.1). As an active 
negotiator on MRAs, the EU has also seen the relevance of the TBT Agreements 
Article 6.3 on how to enhance the establishment of such agreements. However, the 
EUs own experience has highlighted the many problems with maintaining viable 
MRAs. The European Commission has thus become more sceptical about the 
applicability of this tool, particularly in cases involving trade with developing 
countries. The Commission has planned to share its experience with MRAs with 
the Committee. Thus, with regard to the work in the TBT Committee, the 
Commission seeks to promote regulatory approaches that are based on and 
compatible with European practises and experiences. 
 
The SPS Committees work on trade facilitating tools, particularly equivalence, has 
produced more concrete results than the TBT Committees work on these issues. 
The SPS Agreement does not explicitly refer to mutual recognition, but instead 
refers to bilateral and multilateral agreements on the recognition of equivalence (see 
below). The agreement has one main provision dealing exclusively with equiva-
lence, namely Article 4 entitled Equivalence: 
 
1. Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other 
Members as equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or from 
those used by other Members trading in the same product, if the exporting 
Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its measures 
achieve the importing Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection.  For this purpose, reasonable access shall be given, upon request, to 
the importing Member for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures. 
 
 
Trade Facilitation through Equivalence and Mutual Recognition: The EU Model 
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute / Centre for Food Policy, 2006 
41
2. Members shall, upon request, enter into consultations with the aim of 
achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements on recognition of the equivalence 
of specified sanitary or phytosanitary measures. 
 
The SPS Committee has for many years discussed the implementation of Article 4. 
These discussions resulted in the Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which 
the SPS Committee adopted in 2001 and which subsequently has been revised 
several times.22 Inputs from WTO members regarding their experiences with 
equivalence recognition have been important for these discussions.  
The EU was one of the WTO Members that made submissions on this issue. In 
2002 the EU submitted a document to the SPS Committee which described the 
application of equivalence to inspection and certification systems in its imports of 
fishery products (WTO 2002c). The objective of the document was to provide 
other WTO Members with a practical example of how the EU has applied the 
principle in its day-to-day work regarding trade relations with third countries, in 
particular towards facilitating trade with WTO Members which are developing or 
less developed countries.  
The principle of equivalence is reflected, inter alia, in Articles 10 and 11 of the 
EC Council Directive 91/493/EEC. Article 10 says that provisions applied to 
imports of fishery products from third countries shall be at least equivalent to those 
governing the production and placing on the market of Community products, 
whereas Article 11 elaborates on the specific import conditions that need to be ful-
filled. It is important to note that the EU stresses that the purpose of the Directive 
is to describe the system rather than the individual measures, and that the EU has 
always emphasized the prerequisite need for an equivalent system before conside-
ring product equivalence (WTO 2002c: 2). Thus, the EU views that the discussion 
on the application of equivalence in line with Article 4 of the SPS Agreement first 
must concentrate on equivalence determinations regarding food inspection and 
certification systems. This is also reflected in EUs own work on these issues. The 
EU has in practice concentrated much of its work on equivalence determinations 
on different aspects of food inspection and certification systems, for example 
regarding imports of fishery products. 
The first conditional step of determining equivalence according to EC Council 
Directive 91/493/EEC is to make documentary evaluations of the inspection 
system of the exporting country. Import conditions are furthermore adapted to the 
particular situation in the third country based on the equivalence of the inspection 
and certification system. The exporting country should issue a health certificate to 
follow the consignment in order to provide assurance that the inspection of the 
fishery products has been performed in an equivalent way to the EUs standards. 
The same procedure applies to a listing of approved establishments and auction or 
wholesale markets registered and approved by the competent authority. When the 
                                           
 22 An account of the work on equivalence in the SPS Committee, including the Committees 
Decision on this issue, is given in Veggeland and Elvestad (2004: 17-21). 
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sufficient guarantees have been provided to establish an equivalent system of 
inspection, the products concerned can be exported. 
The EU approach to recognizing the equivalence of inspection and certification 
systems for fishery products has led to a reduction in the frequency of physical 
controls at border inspection posts: from 100 percent physical control to 50 or 20 
percent, depending on the risk level. Furthermore, from 1991 up until 2002, 62 
third countries had been recognized as having implemented equivalent systems of 
inspection and certification for fishery products and hence, in principle, had 
achieved better access to the EU market. 
The EU has generally been active in contributing information to the SPS 
Committee on its experiences in applying equivalence. EUs contributions through 
submissions and participation in the Committees discussions, illustrate that on this 
issue, EU emphasizes the work on the equivalence of food inspection and 
certification systems more than the work on product equivalency. This is also 
reflected in the EUs work with Codex. 
 
The principle of equivalence has been on the agenda in Codex for many years, 
particularly in the Codex Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and 
Certification Systems (CCFICS). Equivalence is even included as one of the Codex 
Commissions main principles for food import and export inspection and certifi-
cation (Codex Alimentarius Commission 1995): 
 
12. Countries should recognize that different inspection/certification systems 
may be capable of meeting the same objective, and are therefore equivalent. The 
obligation to demonstrate equivalence rests with the exporting country. 
 
CCFICS has furthermore produced several guidelines where the principle of 
equivalence is included as an integral part.23 The Guidelines for the Design, 
Operation, Assessment and Accreditation of Food Import and Export Inspection 
and Certification Systems (Codex Alimentarius Commission 1997) includes a 
whole section on the application of equivalence in connection with accreditation. 
The Guidelines for the Development of Equivalence Agreements Regarding Food 
Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems provides practical 
guidance for governments desiring to enter into bilateral or multilateral equivalence 
agreements concerning food import and export inspection and certification systems 
(Codex Alimentarius Commission 1999).  
Finally, there are the Guidelines on the Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary 
Measures Associated with Food Inspection and Certification Systems (Codex 
                                           
 23 See also Elvestad and Veggeland (2005) for a presentation of these guidelines. 
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Alimentarius Commission 2003). These guidelines, which were adopted by the 
Codex Commission in 2003, were developed on the basis of a request from the 
WTOs SPS Committee for the Codex to provide guidance with regard to the 
practical understanding and application of equivalence as indicated in Article 4 of 
the SPS Agreement. The EU has been actively involved in this work and I will thus 
make a short presentation on the EUs written contributions to the work on these 
guidelines.24 
In its comments a Discussion Paper25 that was presented at a CCFICS meeting 
in February 2000, the EU stated that it could agree in principle to further work on 
the draft guidelines. However, its condition for agreeing to do so was that the EU 
Member States be actively involved in the development of the text and that other 
relevant Codex committees be consulted prior to redrafting.  
In its comments to the proposed Draft Guidelines26 that were presented in 
December 2000 the EU clearly expressed its will to focus the work on the systems of 
food inspection and certification, rather than on the measures themselves. 
Accordingly, the EU wanted to limit the scope of the guidelines by changing the 
wording Sanitary measures involved in the determination of equivalence to 
Sanitary measures related to inspection and certification systems (authors emphasis).  
In its comments to a Codex Circular Letter CL 2001/25-FICS distributed in 
2001, the EU stated that it supported the Draft Guidelines, but made some 
comments on the scope and definition of sanitary measures. The EU meant that 
the scope was too narrow and that the document should include judgement of 
equivalence for all food safety issues, and also some of the hazards that are not 
covered by the SPS Agreements definition of food safety, such as food allergens. 
The same comments were made by the EU in 2002 with regard to a Codex Sircular 
Letter CL 2002/8-FICS.  
At the end of 2002 the final Draft Guidelines were presented. This time the EU 
only made one short comment, namely that it supported the present document on 
the Draft Guidelines. These Guidelines were subsequently adopted by the Codex 
Commission in its meeting in July 2003. 
Parallel to the work on the Draft Guidelines on the Judgement of Equivalence 
of Sanitary Measures Associated with Food Inspection and Certification Systems, 
CCFICS has also considered developing Guidelines on the Judgement of 
Equivalence of Technical Regulations Associated with Food Inspection and 
Certification Systems. Initially, this work was meant to take place in parallel with 
the development of the guidelines on sanitary measures. A document containing 
proposed draft guidelines on technical regulations quite similar to the guidelines on 
sanitary measures was thus presented to the committee. However, the CCFICS 
members soon realized that it would be a more complicated process to develop 
                                           
 24 This presentation is simply based on EUs Codex position papers, which are to be found on 
the homepage of DG SANCO: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/  
 25 Discussion Paper on the Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures Associated with 
Food Inspection and Certification Systems. 
 26 Draft Guidelines on the Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures Associated with 
Food Inspection and Certification Systems. 
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guidelines on the equivalence of technical regulations. Furthermore, Codex had not 
received a request from the WTO to provide guidance in the area of technical 
regulations; it had received such a request concerning sanitary measures. The work 
on guidelines for equivalence of technical regulations was thus slowed down, 
whereas the work on guidelines for equivalence of sanitary measures sped up.  
CCFICS put the proposed guidelines for equivalence of technical regulations 
away and decided to focus on discussion papers instead. The aim was to explore 
further whether it was worth spending time and resources on developing guidelines 
in this area. Because of the reluctance of several Codex members to proceed, 
CCFICS decided at its meeting in December 2003 that the work on these guide-
lines should temporarily be halted. 
The EU made several contributions to the discussions on guidelines for the 
equivalence of technical regulations. In 2000 the EU stated that a document on 
Proposed Draft Guidelines27 had still not reached a sufficient degree of maturity. 
Specifically, the EU thought that it did not clearly reflect the fact that equivalence 
of technical regulations must be based on the results of the assessment of a system 
of food inspection and certification (authors emphasis). Furthermore, the EU 
thought that the document did not sufficiently reflect the provisions of the WTOs 
TBT Agreement. The EU wanted thus to focus on systems and conformity 
assessment and did not see the need for or relevance of including in such guidelines 
the methodologies for comparing technical regulations per se. 
In its comments to the discussion paper on the guidelines for the equivalence of 
technical regulations that were presented in 2002, the EU reiterated its view that 
CCFICS should focus on the equivalence of inspection and certification systems, 
which is within its mandate, and not on the equivalence of technical TBT 
regulations, which in the opinion of the EU is not within CCFICS mandate. The 
EU thus wanted to focus on conformity procedures. The EU further stated that it 
should be considered whether it is more appropriate to have a common (universal) 
approach for all kinds of inspection and certification systems or a more graduated 
approach taking into account the specificity of each system. 
The comments that the EU made in 2002 were repeated in 2003 when a new 
discussion paper was presented to CCFICS. Again the EU stressed the need to 
focus on conformity procedures and not technical regulations and referred to the 
definition of technical regulations in the WTOs TBT Agreement, which does not 
include an inspection and certification component. The EU stated that it 
recognised that there is some need for practical guidance on judgement of 
equivalence of conformity assessment procedures. However, the EU suggested that 
Codex first should consider whether this issue is already sufficiently covered by 
Codex Committees and other relevant International Agencies.  
The EU nevertheless concluded that the CCFICS has a role to play in providing 
guidance to Codex Members in determining the equivalence of the competence of 
conformity assessment bodies. However, before initiating this new work the EU 
felt the need to consider whether the existing Codex guidelines (c.f. Codex Alimen-
                                           
 27 Proposed Draft Guidelines on the Judgement on Equivalence of Technical Regulations 
associated with Food Inspection and Certification Systems. 
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tarius Commission 1997) cover the need for guidance in the determination of 
equivalence. The EU did not see the need for a new separate text dealing 
specifically with conformity assessment bodies, but meant instead that the existing 
guidelines should be amended, if necessary, in order to take into account specific 
needs related to these bodies. Regarding mutual recognition, the EU pointed out 
that this issue was not in the terms of reference of the CCFICS and that the Codex 
Commission therefore should establish a clear mandate. 
The EU was thus one of the few Codex members that was positive about 
CCFICS doing at least some work on guidelines for the judgement of equivalence 
of technical regulations associated with food inspection and certification systems. 
Still, CCFICS decided that the work should be put on hold. 
 
The EU has proven to be an active player with regard to establishing accepted 
international principles and guidelines on the application and understanding of 
equivalence and mutual recognition as trade facilitating tools. There have further-
more been important internal reforms in the organization of EUs regulatory 
activities, which have given the European Commission quite some leeway in 
promoting EUs regulatory policies in international fora. The EU seems to view the 
international work as a natural extension of the work that has been done within the 
EU. Thus, partly based on its experience with the internal market, the EU has 
actively promoted ideas and approaches for facilitating trade internationally. This is 
particularly true for the food sector, where the European Commission participates 
on behalf of the EU in several international bodies (such as the SPS Committee, 
Codex, IPPC and OIE), and where the EU as a major global food exporter and 
importer has introduced alternative tools to facilitate market access for EU 
exporters while at the same time allowing exporters to the EU better access to the 
EU market.  
The EU has thus had great influence in shaping how trade facilitating tools such 
as the principles of equivalence and mutual recognition can be understood and 
applied in practise. The EUs experience is furthermore important as a basis for 
deciding which trade facilitating tools should be used in different contexts 
internationally. 
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The EU stands out as an international entrepreneur with regard to negotiating 
MRAs as well as applying the principles of equivalence and mutual recognition. 
Furthermore, the EU has shown itself to be an influential actor on the world stage 
with regard to sharing experiences and providing guidance on how these trade 
facilitating tools can be used in practise. Thus, the experience of the EU is of 
particular interest when assessing the prospects of and difficulties in applying these 
tools. In this chapter I will thus summarize some of the core characteristics of EUs 
trade facilitation model, point out some of the factors which have contributed to 
shaping this model, and finally make some assessments of EUs experience with 
applying different trade facilitating tools in a global setting. 
 
This report is not aimed at describing in depth all the approaches and tools that the 
EU applies in order to facilitate trade. Instead, it has focused on some of the impor-
tant elements of what can be called the EU model. I have identified some core 
characteristics of this model, which are important to understanding how the EU 
has approached trade facilitation in the regulatory field. 
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The level of integration in the EU is greater than in other regional economic co-
operations. An important aspect of the EU integration process has been the 
creation of strong common institutions. Thus, the EU has a large capacity for both 
developing and enforcing common (harmonized) rules and policies and for acting 
with a single voice in a global setting. The existence of a strong executive (the 
European Commission) compared to what exists in other international organiza-
tions is particularly important in order to understand how the EU has managed to 
facilitate trade both between its Member States and between the EU and third 
countries. 
The European Commission separates the management of the internal market 
from the management of external trade relations. The experience with the 
establishment of a single European market has nevertheless highlighted some of 
the pitfalls and possibilities attached to applying different trade facilitating tools. 
This experience is also relevant in a wider international context. The work on the 
single European market has been an important testing ground for applying 
different approaches towards removing trade barriers. This work and this experi-
ence have also influenced discussions on trade facilitation in international fora. 
The establishment of the single European market created a need for the EU to 
strengthen and further develop common approaches and policies in the field of 
external trade. The European Commission thus made several important initiatives 
in the 1990s and later. 
The Commission was in forefront internationally with regard to negotiating 
equivalence agreements and MRAs. In this way, the EU managed to set an example 
concerning how these trade facilitating tools could be used. Thus, the EU 
influenced the work on these issues in the WTO and other relevant international 
fora such as the Codex. The EU furthermore gained influence on other countries 
regulatory systems through its bilateral trade agreements. Several observers have 
noted that the bilateral agreements have been catalysts for the EUs transfer of its 
regulatory policies, including the principle of mutual recognition, to the other 
parties to the agreements, and that this transfer has been greater from the EU to 
other countries than vice versa (Nicolaodis 1997; Shaffer 2002; Steffenson 2002). 
There are several important elements that characterize the EUs trade 
facilitation model. First, the EU has had extensive experience both negative and 
positive, with harmonizing rules between Member States with the aim of facilitating 
trade. Second, the EU model gradually included the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition. Subsequently this resulted in the establishment of the new 
approach to standardization within the internal market and the global approach 
in its third- country relations, which complemented and supplemented harmoniza-
tion as a trade facilitating tool. Third, based partly on its experience from the work 
within the internal market, the EU has applied and tested a complex mix of 
different trade facilitating tools in its third-country relations. 
In some respects, the EU has thus acted as an entrepreneur with regard to 
applying the principles of equivalence and mutual recognition in a global setting. 
Furthermore, the EU has been active in participating in the discussions on 
regulatory issues taking place in international bodies such as the WTO and Codex. 
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This active involvement can be explained by, inter alia, its experience from the 
European integration process described above, as well as the European 
Commissions high level of competence in the fields of trade and regulatory 
policies. Furthermore, the Commission has acquired more competence from the 
EU Member States on these issues than on many other issues. Thus, the regulatory 
work taking place in international bodies where the Commission has gained access 
has been viewed by some EU officials as a possible extension of EUs own regula-
tory policies. This has furthermore necessitated an active strategy towards 
developing strong, common EU positions, which again has enhanced EUs interna-
tional influence in the regulatory field. 
 
Although the EU has made use of different trade facilitating tools in its third 
country trade relations, not all of its experience in applying these tools has been 
positive. Below, I will first make some assessments of EUs experience with Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRAs) and Veterinary Equivalency Agreements (VEAs). 
Then I will make a short assessment of the use of equivalence as a supplement and 
complement to EUs import regime for third countries. Finally, based on the EU 
experience I summarize the prospects of and difficulties in applying equivalence 
and mutual recognition in a global context. I also briefly comment upon an alterna-
tive approach to trade facilitation, which has gained increased attention from the 
EU in recent years due, inter alia, to the experienced problems and limits of formal 
agreements. 
 
The EU has realized that there are clear limitations with regard to applying both 
equivalence agreements and MRAs. Such comprehensive agreements are often 
costly to negotiate and maintain. They normally necessitate some prior harmoniza-
tion before negotiations can start. Negotiations are normally initiated with partners 
that have a comparable level of development to the EUs; despite this, the agree-
ments may be very difficult to implement in practise. Another aspect is that it has 
proven difficult to measure precisely the trade benefits derived from the 
agreements. In fact, comments by officials of both the EU and the U.S. indicate 
that the costs are sometimes perceived to exceed the benefits.  
Thus, based on its experience with existing agreements the European 
Commission is not currently interested in negotiating more traditional MRAs. The 
experience with VEAs shows many of the same difficulties. In practise it has 
proven difficult to perform equivalence determinations within these agreements, 
which is partly why the European Commission often chooses to refer to them as 
veterinary agreements instead of as equivalence agreements. As is the case with 
the MRAs, to negotiate and maintain VEAs demands that the parties have relatively 
advanced levels of infrastructure and of administrative and regulatory capacity. 
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Thus, some of the EUs experience with regard to MRAs and equivalence 
agreements are quite discouraging. Such comprehensive agreements demand that 
the parties spend significant time and resources in order to negotiate, maintain and 
update them. Furthermore, it seems to be difficult for developing countries to be 
allowed to enter into negotiations on such agreements. This is clearly reflected in 
EUs traditional MRAs, which have only been negotiated with advanced developed 
countries (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States, Israel, Japan, and 
Switzerland). VEAs have been negotiated with either advanced developed countries 
(United States, Canada, Australia) or advanced developing countries (Chile, 
Mercosur). 
Based on the EU experience it is possible to identify some important points with 
regard to the prospects of and difficulties in applying comprehensive MRAs and 
equivalence agreements. Some of these points can be summarized as follows: 
 : The basic objective of MRAs and equivalence 
agreements is of course to facilitate trade. A certain volume of trade between 
the parties in products important for both parties should thus exist before 
the parties enter into negotiations. Both the MRA and the VEA between the 
EU and the U.S. are clear examples of agreements that potentially could have 
a big trade facilitating effect because of the large amount of trade involved. 
Thus, the agreements should in effect give something in return for the 
resources spent on negotiations and administration. However, these returns 
may not necessarily be of an economic nature, but rather could be of a 
political nature. 
 
 : EU officials have pointed out 
that trade agreements can be mainly driven by political will and political 
salience, in which case they would not necessarily bring significant economic 
returns. However, the agreements can nevertheless be important because of 
their political effect, either through the establishment of a generally closer 
economic relationship with a preferred country or through closer regulatory 
co-operation and dialogue more specifically. Political returns from 
establishing formal relationships with trading partners through MRAs and 
equivalence agreements could thus be an extra incentive, and sometimes a 
prerequisite, for entering into negotiations. 
  
 Trade agreements should include
sectors and products that are of interest to both parties. For example, there 
was much discussion between the EU and the U.S. on which sectors to 
include in an MRA. Initially, a large number of sectors were placed on the 
negotiation table, but only a few ended up as part of the MRA; some were of 
special interest to the U.S. and some were of special interest to the EU.  
 
  As already indicated, the parties levels of 
development matter when deciding to enter into negotiations on bilateral 
trade agreements. A sufficient infrastructure and regulatory capacity must be 
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in place in order for MRAs and equivalence agreements to work properly. 
This is of utmost importance because of the fact that these agreements pre-
suppose that the parties trust and have confidence in each others regulatory 
systems. Verification and the assurance that systems can deliver are there-
fore needed in order to establish viable agreements.
 
 : The EUs 
experience clearly shows that the political institutions and regulatory frame-
works of the parties to MRAs and equivalence agreements affect the way 
these agreements work. The EU-U.S. MRA is a good example of this. The 
MRA was negotiated by the European Commission and the U.S. Trade 
Representative with the assistance of the relevant regulatory agencies. 
However, when the MRA came into operation the EU experienced 
problems because it had to deal with a large number of U.S. agencies, each 
of which had full responsibility for different parts of the agreement. Each 
agency furthermore had its own regulatory culture and its own clear views 
on the best way to regulate. The U.S. for its part had to deal with only the 
European Commission, but nevertheless experienced problems when 
changes or amendments to the agreement were needed, because this deman-
ded a formal decision by the Council of the European Union. Thus, 
organizational asymmetry and divergent regulatory cultures may cause 
problems in negotiating and maintaining trade agreements.  
 
The EU has also applied equivalence on a unilateral basis. In the fisheries sector, 
the EU on its own initiative evaluates the equivalency of other countries inspection 
and certification systems in order to determine if their systems are at an equivalent 
level which would allow them to export to the EU market. The approved 
inspection and certification systems are then put on the EUs list of approved 
systems. The fishery products that are inspected in the exporting countries having 
approved facilities must however comply with EU food regulations. These rules 
that allow for such one-way equivalency judgements facilitate trade by making it 
easier for countries to export fishery products to the EU. At the same time the 
administrative burden on the EUs own inspection service is relieved because 
inspections are done by the exporting countries. 
EUs rules for organic food also include one-way equivalence judgements, but 
these equivalence judgements are performed for both product regulations and for 
inspection and certification systems. Countries that are allowed to export their 
organic foods to the EU as a result of such one-way equivalence judgements are 
put on a list of approved countries. 
Equivalence judgements concerning organic foods are performed at the request 
of the exporting country. EU officials have stated that it is easier to determine 
equivalence for those countries that base their national rules on the same interna-
tional standards as the EU uses. For example, with regard to organic food the most 
relevant standards would be Codex standards. The EU may accept as equivalent the 
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imports of organic foods from countries which base their national regulations on 
relevant Codex standards. 
Though not being widely used, such one-way equivalence judgements under the 
EUs import regime are of some significance in facilitating trade in certain sectors 
and in certain situations.  
 
Because the EU possesses certain characteristics, the EU can facilitate trade 
relatively easily between its Member States; on the other hand, it is much harder in 
many other international settings for the countries involved to facilitate trade 
amongst themselves. For example the EU possesses a comprehensive legal frame-
work and relatively strong institutions to enforce common rules. This gives it a 
strong regulatory capacity and thus makes it a special case with regard to the 
methods used to achieve trade facilitation.  
Thus, one has to set a lower ambition level with regard to facilitating trade in 
many other international settings. The experience of the EU certainly shows that 
equivalence and mutual recognition may be useful trade facilitating tools and that 
these tools could be used in and could have a positive effect on trade relations 
between many countries internationally. However, there are many problems 
attached to this; for example, developing countries will in many cases have 
problems with achieving equivalence and/or recognition of their conformity 
assessment systems because of inadequacies in their infrastructures and regulatory 
capacities.  
Furthermore, even when applied between countries with comparable levels of 
development and regulatory capacity, many problems can arise. These tools may 
therefore in many cases be costly to apply in practise. Thus, one has to carefully 
consider whether it is worth the costs and efforts to enter into processes of judging 
equivalence and seeking mutual recognition.  
Therefore, it seems important to consider on a case-by-case basis whether these 
tools should be applied. Furthermore, increased activity by international standardi-
zation bodies, active country participation in these bodies, and widespread 
adherence to international standards will enhance the application of equivalence 
and mutual recognition, and will enhance harmonization.  
Finally, in many cases equivalence and mutual recognition (or harmonization) 
will initially not be the most (cost) effective trade-facilitating tools. In these cases 
softer approaches such as regulatory dialogue and information sharing etc. may be 
more efficient. It may take a long time to reach the goal of removing trade barriers 
by using these approaches, but they may still be more effective in the long run, 
particularly because they may more easily lead to harmonization. The EU has for 
some years used these softer approaches to facilitate trade, but only as a supple-
ment to other approaches such as MRAs. 
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One example of an alternative approach is the regulatory dialogue that has been 
established between the EU and the U.S. The two parties have agreed on 
Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency under the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership (TEP) and furthermore set out a roadmap for this co-
operation in 2004. The roadmap outlines a range of specific regulatory cooperation 
activities which the parties jointly intend to pursue including: specific sectoral co-
operation, such as co-operation on food safety, pharmaceuticals and auto safety 
regulation;  and horizontal initiatives, such as a regular informal dialogue on 
regulatory policy issues and practices of mutual interest; identification of resources 
and mechanisms to promote exchanges of EU and U.S. regulatory experts; and 
seminar/workshops where regulators can exchange views and raise awareness of 
regulatory activities, priorities and approaches on issues of mutual interest. 
The European Commission has established such regulatory dialogues with 
several other countries and has in fact stated that it will increase its attention and 
efforts towards the use of such approaches to achieve regulatory compatibility. 
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The EU has been in forefront internationally with regard to applying and 
promoting the principles of equivalence and mutual recognition. One of the 
important factors explaining this position is the EUs unique work on realising an 
effective and well-functioning internal market and thus facilitating trade between 
Member States, which from the outset had different regulatory cultures and 
practises. EU has thus gained valuable experience with applying a mix of different 
trade-facilitating tools, including harmonization and mutual recognition in 
particular. 
The EU has also applied a mix of trade-facilitating tools in its third-country trade 
relations. However, the mix of tools used in these relations is different from that 
which is used internally, particularly because the EU and its partners (the other 
parties) in such bilateral trade agreements do not have strong common institutions 
to enforce the agreements between them, such as the EU institutions (European 
Commission, European Court of Justice etc.) which enforce the EUs own rules for 
the internal market. Thus, regarding external trade, the EU has to a large degree 
applied rules which imply that exporters to the EU must comply with EU 
standards in order to gain market access to the EU. These rules are, however, 
supplemented with inter alia, the use of mutual or unilateral (one-way) recognition 
of conformity assessment procedures and judgements of equivalency. 
The EUs experience shows that judgements of equivalence are easier when the 
two parties involved base their national rules on the same international standards. 
Thus, an active involvement in international standardization bodies becomes 
paramount in facilitating regulatory co-operation. Furthermore, the EU has little 
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experience with judgements of the equivalence of product standards or regulations, 
at least not within the framework of equivalence agreements or MRAs. Thus, the 
EUs focus is on judgements of the equivalence of regulatory systems, particularly 
food inspection and certification systems. This is also true for EUs rules on the 
imports of fishery products, which include judgements of the equivalence of fish 
inspection and certification systems. However, the EUs rules on the imports of 
organic food include judgements of equivalence of the technical product regula-
tions in addition to inspection and certification systems. 
All of the EUs MRAs are about the recognition of conformity assessment 
systems, and some of them also include equivalence judgements. However, 
equivalence of product standards and regulations is not included. 
Thus, mutual recognition and equivalence seem to be most relevant and easiest 
to apply with regard to the approval of systems or parts of systems for conformity 
assessment, including certification and inspection. Furthermore, it seems to be 
easier to apply these tools on a case-by-case basis adapted to specific contexts than 
to include them in general and comprehensive formal agreements.  
 
The EUs experience in applying mutual recognition and equivalence is dis-
couraging in some respects and promising in others: 
First, the EUs experience indicates that it is important not to set the ambition 
level too high with regard to how much trade facilitation can be achieved by 
applying these tools.  
Second, a gradual approach towards regulatory co-operation seems to be the 
most effective in preparing the ground for the removal of regulatory trade barriers 
through equivalence, mutual recognition or ultimately some kind of harmonization.  
Third, the EUs experience indicates that it may be wise to focus on equivalence 
of regulatory systems, including conformity assessment procedures, before making 
efforts to determine equivalence for a wide variety of product standards and 
regulations.  
Fourth, the EUs experience highlights the importance of international 
standardization work which subsequently may facilitate the use of equivalence and 
mutual recognition and bring different regulatory systems closer together. 
International standards are well suited as a basis for determining equivalence and 
furthermore make the process of determining equivalence less complicated and 
potentially less time-consuming. It is also easier to achieve mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment systems when they are based on the same international 
guidelines and standards. 
 
This report has explored the EUs experience with equivalence and mutual recog-
nition and pointed out some of the limitations to applying these tools in bilateral 
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trade relations. Furthermore, it has highlighted the possible gains from spending 
more efforts on so-called soft approaches to harmonization. By entering into 
regulatory dialogues and by sharing experiences more actively, regulatory 
authorities could contribute to building sufficient confidence and trust thus 
enhancing closer and more formalized co-operations such as, for example, MRAs 
and equivalence agreements. These softer regulatory co-operation efforts, which 
to take place do not require formally negotiated agreements, may subsequently lead 
to a gradual harmonization of regulatory systems thus enhancing the work on 
removing regulatory trade barriers. 
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Interviews with officials from the European Commissions DG SANCO, DG 
Trade, DG Agriculture and DG Enterprise, officials from United States Food and 
Drug Administration and Department of Agriculture, officials from delegations to 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission and with former officials of the Secretariat of 
Codex. The interviews were conducted in July 2003, October 2005, and February 
and March 2006. 
